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of the Nondiscrimination Norm
EDWARD A. ZELINSKYt
INTRODUCTION
The increasing tendency of large employers to convert
their traditional defined benefit pension plans to the cash
balance format has engendered substantial controversy,
both within the qualified plan community and among the
general public.' The rise of "new comparability" plans has
yet to generate the same level of popular or political
concern, perhaps because such plans have largely been
embraced by smaller employers. However, among pension
mavens, new comparability has occasioned strong
supporters2 and equally firm detractors.3
' Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, Room
519, 55 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003, phone: 212-790-0277, fax:
212-790-0205, e-mail: Zelinsky@prodigy.net. I am indebted to many who
reviewed and criticized drafts of this article: Professors James A. Wooten,
Jonathan Barry Forman, Peter M. Van Zante, Norman Stein, and Bruce Wolk;
Robert J. Michalski, EA, CPC, MSPA, Patrick J. Purcell, Alvin D. Lurie, Esq.
Needless to say, many of this brotherhood of pension mavens disagree strongly
with my analysis and conclusions; none agrees with everything I have to say.
All were nevertheless gracious with their time and advice.
1. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX
REV. 683 (2000) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Cash Balance Controversy]; Edward A.
Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy Revisited: Age Discrimination and
Fidelity to Statutory Text, 20 VA. TAX REV. 527 (2001) [hereinafter Zelinsky,
Cash Balance Controversy Revisited]; Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon,
Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 380
(2000); U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., CASH BALANCE PLANS, IMPLICATIONS FOR
RETIREMENT INCOME (2000); U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFF., PRIVATE PENSIONS,
IMPLICATIONS OF CONVERSIONS TO CASH BALANCE PLANS (2000).
2. See, e.g., BRIAN GRAFF, SMALL BUSINESS RETIREMENT PLANS WILL
TERMINATE DUE TO POTENTIAL TREASURY CHANGES TO QUALIFIED PLAN
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So far, these two controversies have largely remained
isolated from one another. It is, however, the premise of
this article that these two controversies raise a common
underlying issue: the propriety of cross-testing, i.e.,
analyzing defined benefit arrangements as if they were
defined contribution plans and vice versa.
The Treasury regulations on economic discrimination4
explicitly condone cross-testing. Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive of either the cash balance controversy in its
current form or the new comparability format without the
Treasury's formal approval of cross-testing. Thus, at one
level, the issue raised by the cash balance and new
comparability approaches is whether the Treasury was
correct to condone the cross-testing without which these
"hybrid"5 approaches to retirement income would not have
emerged.
REGULATIONS: MORE TnIE Is NEEDED TO STUDY THE ISSUE (2000),
http://vww.aspa.org/archivepages/gad/2000/newcomppaper.htm (last visited
May 14, 2001); see also Speakers Tell IRS New Comparability Hearing
Regulations Will Hurt Small Businesses, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Jan.
26, 2001, at D9; Bonner Menking, Witnesses Want New Comparability Plan
Rules On Combined DB/DC Revamped, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 31, 2001, at
2001 TNT 21-32; Colleen T. Congel, Defined Contribution Plans: Letters Reveal
Split in Pension Industry Over 'Comparability' Cross-Testing Methods, BNA
PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, June 12, 2000, at D2; Karen W. Ferguson, Debate
Over Restrictions On New Comparability Plans Continues, 87 TAX NOTES 1470,
1471 (2000); Sal Tripodi & John P. Griffin, New Comparability Plans Survive
After New Regulations, PENSION ACTUARY (American Society of Pension
Actuaries), Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 1.
3. See, e.g., Martin A. Corry, AARP Criticizes New Comparability Plans, TAX
NOTES TODAY, July 6, 2000, at 2000 TNT 130-59; Lee A. Sheppard, New
Comparability Plan Rules and Cross-Testing Generally, 89 TAX NOTES 336
(2000); Daniel Halperin, Why Pension Reform Legislation Is a Bad Idea, 89 TAX
NOTES 958, 959 (2000) ("[The growth of hybrid arrangements, in particular
various forms of age-weighted profit sharing plans, most notoriously 'new
comparability' plans, have recently further skewed coverage in favor of the
higher paid."); Congel, supra note 2; Ferguson, supra note 2.
4. It bears emphasis that the focus of the cross-testing regulations, and
hence this article, is the Code's prohibition on economic discrimination (i.e.,
discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees), although I do discuss
age discrimination infra Part IV.
5. The term "hybrid" plan is generally used to refer to qualified plans
designed to utilize cross-testing by mixing the attributes of the defined benefit
and defined contribution approaches. See DAN M. MCGILL ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 297 (7th ed. 1996); see also PATRICK J.
PURCELL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
PENSION COVERAGE AND PARTICIPATION: SUiSmARY OF RECENT TRENDS 3 (2000)
("In recent years, many employers have converted their traditional pensions to
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A principal contention of this article is that the
Treasury was correct to embrace cross-testing, as the
relevant concern should be the substance of the allocation of
pension resources, rather than the form by which that
allocation is achieved. Given as baselines the distribution of
pension resources achievable through defined benefit
arrangements, there is no persuasive basis for opposing
hybrid plans (like new comparability arrangements) which,
via cross-testing, achieve outcomes substantively similar to
such baselines. In this area, substance-rather than form-
should control and, in substance, cross-tested hybrid plans
allocate pension resources in a fashion similar to
conventional defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
Moreover, an exploration of the merits of cross-testing
reveals a second stratum of concern, for that exploration
discloses the theoretical and practical incoherence of the
nondiscrimination mandate which cross-testing imple-
ments. As a theoretical matter, the nondiscrimination norm
ignores the time value of money. The nondiscrimination
norm consequently equates nominally identical benefits
which, because they will be paid at different times, have
significantly different present values. Likewise, the
nondiscrimination norm equates markedly dissimilar
contributions because, over different time frames to
retirement, they will produce the same nominal benefits.
In practice, if participants are of widely varied ages,
allocations of qualified plan resources proscribed by the
nondiscrimination principle when made under the defined
contribution format become acceptable when achieved via a
defined benefit formula. Similarly, given employees of
significantly different ages, plan allocations forbidden in
the name of nondiscrimination when accomplished via the
defined contribution motif are permitted when such
allocations are formulated in defined benefit terms.
The nondiscrimination norm is particularly
manipulable in the context of small plans and thus fails
precisely when, in the terms advocated by its proponents,
the norm is most needed to protect rank-and-file employees
and the public fisc.
From this analysis, a number of corollaries flow: Cross-
testing is not a mistake, but a textually plausible approach
hybrid plans that have characteristics of both [defined benefit and defined
contribution] plans.") (emphasis in original).
2001] 577
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to the nondiscrimination norm which imparts useful
flexibility to the overly-complex and constricting qualified
plan regime. Insofar as cross-testing exposes the theoretical
and practical incoherence of the nondiscrimination norm, it
is that norm, not cross-testing, which should be reassessed.
Treasury Notice 2000-14 and the recently-adopted
regulations aimed at cross-tested new comparability plans
are analytically weak. The new regulations rest on shaky
statutory grounds insofar as these regulations mandate
double testing for new comparability arrangements, i.e.,
testing for nondiscrimination twice, once on the basis of
projected benefits, a second time on the basis of
contributions. In the final analysis, the nondiscrimination
norm has outlived its usefulness and should be abolished or
replaced by straightforward statutory requirements for
minimum contributions and benefits.
The first section of this article sets the background by
describing the cash balance and new comparability motifs
as well as the concept of cross-testing upon which these
hybrid motifs depend.
The second section explores critiques of cross-testing, in
particular, the concerns raised in Treasury Notice 2000-14
and addressed in recently-adopted regulations pertaining to
new comparability arrangements. An important focus of
this section is a comparison of new comparability uses of
cross-testing with "age-weighted" designs condoned in
Notice 2000-14 and the new regulations. This section
concludes that, as a matter of policy, cross-testing should be
permitted. There is no reason for an allocation of pension
resources acceptable under the defined benefit format to be
rejected in the defined contribution setting. There is
similarly no reason for an allocation permitted in the
defined contribution context to be spurned under the
defined benefit banner. In this context, substance should
control over form; much of the opposition to new
comparability methodologies is best understood as
reflecting opposition to small plans and the legal rules
which permit them.
The third section of this article argues that cross-
testing reveals a deeper flaw in the qualified plan regime,
the theoretical and practical incoherence of the
nondiscrimination norm. Most dramatically, when covered
workers are of significantly different ages, patterns of
pension resources outlawed as discriminatory in the defined
578 [Vol. 49
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benefit setting are condoned in the defined contribution
context and vice versa. Among other themes in this section,
I argue that the search for the limits of hybrid plans has
been reinforced by the emergence of a defined contribution
culture6 in which retirement arrangements are expected
less in the traditional, defined benefit form and more in the
individual account format. The advent of a defined
contribution culture has led employers and their qualified
plan advisors to develop plan designs in which defined
benefit pensions are made to resemble defined contribution
arrangements (hence, cash balance pensions) and in which
defined contribution plans are structured to replicate the
economic effects of defined benefit pensions (hence, age-
weighted and new comparability plans). The resulting
profusion of hybrid arrangements has highlighted the
incoherence of the nondiscrimination norm.
While the principal focus of this article is
nondiscrimination as to rank-and-file participants, a fourth
section discusses age discrimination. In this section, I argue
that the current debate about cash balance plans and age
discrimination has largely been unproductive because, inter
alia, the fundamental concept-nondiscrimination-is in
this context incoherent, producing fundamentally different
results if the issue is framed in terms of contributions than
if the issue is posed in terms of ultimate benefits. I also note
that, because there is no statutory authority for cross-
testing as to age discrimination, some plans which, through
cross-testing, avoid discriminating against non-highly
compensated employees may nevertheless, under current
law, be discriminating on the basis of age.
A final section summarizes the implications of this
analysis. I conclude that the pension concept of
nondiscrimination7 has outlived its usefulness and should
be abolished. Even for those who favor a more paternalistic
pension policy than I support, it makes sense to replace the
complex and haphazard rule of nondiscrimination with
simpler mandates for minimum contributions and benefits.
I further conclude that cross-testing properly introduces a
modicum of flexibility to the body of law which
6. See Edward A. Zelinsky, ERISA and the Emergence of the Defined
Contribution Society, 57 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N at 6-1 (1999).
7. To reiterate: this article principally addresses the notion of economic
discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees, although I do discuss
age discrimination infra Part IV.
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overregulates qualified plans, and correctly focuses upon
the substance of pension allocations rather than the form
by which such allocations are implemented. Insofar as
cross-testing exposes the hollowness of the non-
discrimination norm, the appropriate response is not to kill
the messenger, but to reassess the message.
I. CROSS-TESTING, CASH BALANCE PLANS, AND NEW
COMPARABILITY ARRANGEMENTS
A. The Logic of Cross-Testing
A central and venerable feature of the statutory
framework governing qualified plans is that "the
contributions or benefits provided" by such plans may "not
discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees."8 By
itself,9 this nondiscrimination mandate could be read as
requiring defined contribution arrangements to avoid
discrimination on the basis of the employer's plan
contributions and as compelling defined benefit pensions to
avoid discrimination on the basis of ultimate benefits.
There is a comforting symmetry to this construction of the
statute: since defined contribution plans specify the
employer's input (rather than the employee's ultimate
entitlement), for such plans discrimination should be
assessed in terms of the inputs promised by the plan.
Conversely, since defined benefit arrangements specify
their ultimate outputs (rather than the contributions
needed to fund them), discrimination for such plans should
be assessed in terms of such specified outputs.
8. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994). The precise terminology of I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) was
adopted as I.R.C. § 1114(b)(7) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). However, as a substantive matter, the
nondiscrimination norm has been part of qualified plan law since 1942. See
JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 280-
81 (3d ed. 2000).
9. I.R.C. § 415(b)(6) buttresses the statutory argument for cross-testing by
authorizing the Treasury, for purposes of I.R.C. § 401(a)(4), to compute benefits
under defined contribution plans and contributions under defined benefit
arrangements. The Treasury invokes I.R.C. § 415(b)(6) to justify its proposed
new comparability regulations-unconvincingly, I think. However, I.R.C. §
415(b)(6) provides textual confirmation for cross-testing: without such cross-
testing, § 415(b)(6) serves no apparent purpose. See infra text accompanying
notes 130-31.
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However, the statutory terminology is sufficiently
flexible that, as a textual matter, the statute can also
plausibly be read as authorizing cross-testing, i.e.,
assessing defined contribution plans for forbidden
discrimination in terms of the benefits ultimately yielded by
such plans, rather than by the employers' contributions,
and testing defined benefit plans for discrimination by
looking at the employers' inputs, rather than at the plans'
final outputs. That construction is today embodied in the
Treasury regulations. °
For defined contribution plans, the general methodology
of the cross-testing regulations is to convert the
contributions to the employee's individual account balance
to a projected annual benefit commencing at retirement and
to then compare each employee's incremental annual
benefit, so determined, for the presence vel non of forbidden
discrimination." As an initial approximation, such
discrimination is assessed in terms of the proportionality
vel non of projected annuity benefits to each employee's
current salary.
Consider, for example, a two person defined
contribution pension plan which covers the owner of a
business and her secretary. Suppose further that the owner
earns $100,000 annually and is fifty years old, that the
secretary earns $30,000 annually and is thirty-five years
old, and that, for the current year, the employer contributes
$10,000 for the older owner and $883 for her younger
employee. In defined contribution terms, this plan
10. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8 (as amended in 2001)
(discussing cross-testing); see also MCGILL ET AL., supra note 5, at 85; LANGBEIN
& WOLK, supra note 8, at 314-17. A major point of contention in the cash
balance controversy is that the pension provisions addressing age
discrimination provide no textual support for cross-testing when the issue is age
(rather than economic) discrimination. See infra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text.
11. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(2)(i).
12. Three qualifications are in order, two of which will prove important as
the analysis continues. First, the rules for social security integration relax the
test of proportionality to account for the employer's Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) contributions. Second, the nondiscrimination
regulations provide an alternative to a strict rule of proportionality via "rate
groups." See infra text accompanying notes 94-106. This approach to
nondiscrimination becomes important in the context of new comparability
plans. Third, of less practical importance, plans which provide contributions
and benefits without regard to the participants' salaries (for example, $20 per
week regardless of salary) are deemed nondiscriminatory.
2001] 581
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discriminates since, assessing on the basis of the
proportionality of each employee's respective contribution to
her current salary, in this example the highly compensated
owner 13 receives a plan contribution of 10% of her current
salary" while her employee receives a contribution which is
slightly less than 3% of the employee's current
compensation. 5 If defined contribution plans could only test
for discrimination in terms of the proportionality of
contributions to current compensation, this plan fails since
the owner receives more than triple the percentage of her
salary as a pension contribution than the equivalent
percentage for her employee.
The result, however, is radically different under cross-
testing, i.e., measuring this defined contribution
arrangement for the projected benefits it will ultimately
pay. Under that approach, contributions are converted into
the deferred annuities each contribution finances. In such
annuity terms,' 6  our hypothetical owner accrues an
additional $42777 of annual retirement income under the
plan in the current year while her employee earns an
additional $1284" of projected annuity income starting at
retirement. In annuity terms, both receive the same
percentage benefit relative to their respective salaries: both
13. For these purposes, I.R.C. § 414(q)(1)(A) defines an employee as highly
compensated if she owns 5% or more of the employer; moreover, I.R.C. §
414(q)(1)(B) defines an employee as highly compensated if she earns more than
$80,000 annually. See I.R.C. § 414(q)(1)(A)-(B) (1994). For 2001, this figure is
inflation-adjusted to $85,000. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-66, 2000-52 I.R.B. 600.
Thus under either definition the business owner earning $100,000 annually is
deemed highly compensated.
14. $10,000/$100,000 = 10%.
15. $883/$30,000 = 2.9%.
16. In this and in the examples which follow, I have made several
assumptions. In particular, I have assumed an interest rate of 8.5% and have
assumed an annuity purchase rate of $7.94833, i.e., to purchase $1 of annuity
income starting at age sixty-five costs $7.94833. Alternative assumptions would
alter the numbers but not the implications of these examples.
17. The arithmetic is as follows: The fifty year old owner is fifteen years
from normal retirement at age sixty-five. Over the remaining fifteen years of
her working life, the $10,000 contributed currently will grow to $33,997.
$10,000 x (1.085)A15 = $33,997. That sum will, in turn, purchase $4277 in
annual income when the owner retires. $33,997/$7.94833 = $4277.
18. The thirty-five year old employee is thirty years from normal retirement
at age sixty-five. Over the remaining thirty years of her working life, the $883
contributed currently will grow to $10,206. $883 x (1.085)A30 = $10,206. That
amount will, in turn, purchase $1284 of annual income when the employee
retires at age sixty-five. $10,206/$7.94833 = $1284.
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the employer and her employee, in this year, accrue, in
annuity terms, a deferred annual income at retirement
equal to 4.3% of current salary.' 9
This result-pension accruals which, in contribution
terms, discriminate but which, in benefit terms, do not-
reflects the differing ages of the two participants, the
consequently longer term to retirement for the younger, less
well paid employee, and the extra compounding of interest
during the younger employee's longer period to retirement.
Because the contribution for the thirty-five year old
employee has fifteen more years to earn interest than does
the contribution for her boss (who is closer to retirement),
the younger employee's contribution will, dollar for dollar,
ultimately purchase more annuity income for her at age
sixty-five than will the contribution for her older employer.0
This example illuminates the two themes of this paper.
First, cross-testing is a sensible construction of the statute;
there is no reason to proscribe allocations of pension
resources which are acceptable in defined benefit terms
simply because such allocations are implemented through
defined contribution arrangements. In this example, if the
employer were to establish a defined benefit plan, rather
than a defined contribution plan, the economic effect of the
defined benefit motif would mimic the results of the defined
contribution formula she actually embraced. There is no
compelling reason to prohibit the same economic result
when implemented via the defined contribution format; the
relevant inquiry should be the substance of pension
allocations, not their form.2'
Second, as a practical and theoretical matter, the
nondiscrimination norm is incoherent. In a defined
contribution framework, this hypothetical plan
discriminates since the older, better paid business owner
receives a contribution which is a higher percentage of her
19. For the owner, $4277/$100,000 = 4.3%. For her employee, $1284/$30,000
- 4.3%.
20. For the younger employee, each dollar of today's contribution will
become $1.45 of annual annuity income at retirement: $1284/$883 = $1.45. For
her employer, each dollar of today's contribution will become forty-three cents of
annual annuity income at retirement: $4277/$10,000 = $.43. This difference is
attributable to the extra fifteen years during which the contribution for the
younger employee will accrue investment earnings.
21. I construct a possible argument that, as a substantive matter, defined
benefit-style allocations of pension resources should be confined to defined
benefit plans, but find that argument unpersuasive. See infra Part H.F.
2001] 583
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salary than does her lower compensated employee.
However, in defined benefit terms, this plan does not
discriminate since, converting contributions to deferred
annuities, each employee earns an annuity which is the
same percentage of her current salary. Discrimination thus
proves to be an empty concept in this setting, leading to
different conclusions depending upon the form in which the
plan is cast.
On a theoretical level, the nondiscrimination norm is
incoherent because it ignores the time value of money.
Thus, the norm treats as equal benefits which are
nominally the same but which, because they will be paid at
different times, have different present values and are thus
funded currently by different contributions. In our example,
the norm equates a dollar of deferred income to commence
for the business owner in fifteen years with a dollar to start
for the secretary in thirty years-even though the
discounted present values of those dollars are notably
dissimilar."
The analysis is essentially the same when a defined
benefit plan is cross-tested. Suppose we alter the example
so that the thirty-five year old is now the business owner
earning $100,000 per year and the fifty year old is the
secretary making $30,000 annually. Suppose further that
the employer establishes a defined benefit plan under
which the highly paid owner this year accrues $3000 in
annual income starting at retirement while the secretary
accrues in this year a deferred annuity at retirement of
$263 per annum. In defined benefit terms, this plan
discriminates as the business owner earns this year an
annuity equal to 3% of her current year's salary' while her
secretary accrues an annuity equal to less than 1% of her
current salary. 4
However, converting these annuities into current
contributions yields a different picture: looking to inputs
rather than outputs, both the business owner25 and the
22. One dollar payable in thirty years has a present value of less than $.09.
One dollar payable in fifteen years has a present value over three times greater,
twenty-nine cents ($.29). 1/(1.085)A30 = .0865183. 1/(1.085)A15 = .2941399.
Changing the interest rate assumption would alter the details, but not the
thrust, of this example.
23. $3000/$100,000 = 3%.
24. $263/$30,000 = 0.87%.
25. To fund the $3000 deferred annuity earned by the business owner
584 [Vol. 49
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secretary26 receive a contribution which is the same
percentage (2%) of this year's salary. Again, these results
are explained by timing: Because the secretary is closer to
retirement, it costs the employer more to fund a dollar of
annuity income for her since the employer's contribution
has less time to accrue investment interest before payout.
Thus, the secretary's disproportionately small annuity
appears more equitable when analyzed in contribution
terms because, dollar for dollar, it is more costly (and more
valuable) for the employer to provide an annuity for an
older employee.27
B. Cash Balance Plans and Cross-Testing
To the general public, the best known hybrid plan is the
cash balance pension." The common characterization of the
cash balance plan is that it is a defined benefit
arrangement designed to look like a defined contribution
pension. Unlike the traditional defined benefit
arrangement, which promises the participant a deferred
annuity based on his salary and service history, the cash
balance format establishes for each participant a notional
account balance. That theoretical account balance is each
year credited with a hypothetical contribution based on the
employee's compensation (typically denoted "the pay
credit") and with hypothetical earnings (typically denoted
"the interest credit"). When the participant leaves
requires a contribution of $2063, i.e., 2% of the owner's current salary. The
math, per the unit credit funding method, is as follows: To provide an annuity of
$3000 at retirement requires $23,845 at age sixty-five. $3000 x $7.94833 =
$23,845. Discounting for the thirty years to retirement, to have this amount on
hand at age sixty-five requires a contribution of $2063 today.
$23,845/(1.085)^30 = $2063. This contribution is 2% of the owner's current
salary. $2063/$100,000 = 2%.
26. To fund the $263 deferred annuity earned by the fifty year old secretary
requires a contribution of $615, i.e., 2% of the secretary's current salary. The
math, per the unit credit funding method, is as follows: To provide an annuity of
$263 at retirement requires $2090 at age sixty-five. $263 x $7.94833 = $2090.
Discounting for the fifteen years to retirement, to have this amount on hand at
age sixty-five requires a contribution of $615 today. $2090/(1.085)A 15 = $615.
This contribution is 2% of the secretary's current salary. $615/$30,000 = 2%.
27. Since there is no authority for cross-testing as to age discrimination, this
plan does not pass muster under the current statutes governing pension age
discrimination. See infra Part IV.
28. See generally Zelinsky, Cash Balance Controversy, supra note 1
(discussing the cash balance plan).
2001] 585
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
employment, his interest in the plan equals the amount in
this theoretical account balance; the benefit specified in this
defined benefit arrangement.
The notional nature of the cash balance participant's
theoretical account balance contrasts with the participant's
economic interest in the financial performance of his
individual account in a true defined contribution plan." In a
true defined contribution plan, the participant garners his
account's superior investment performance and suffers from
investment losses since his pension entitlement is the
amount to which his account grows or falls. Because it is a
defined contribution arrangement, there is no specified
benefit underwritten by the plan or the employer.
In contrast, in the cash balance setting, the employee
receives precisely the amount in his theoretical account
balance. If plan resources are greater than this theoretical
amount, that excess is retained by the plan since the plan,
once it pays the defined benefit formulated as a notional
account balance, has no further obligation to the employee.
Similarly, if cash balance plan resources are less than the
amount of the participant's notional account balance, the
employer, having assumed a defined benefit commitment,
must contribute to the plan enough to remedy the
deficiency.
Public debate about cash balance plans has largely
focused on the conversion of existing defined benefit
pensions from a traditional, annuity-promising format to
the pseudo-defined contribution motif and the resulting
disappointment of some employees' expectations that they
would continue to earn pension benefits under the
traditional format. However, for purposes of this article, the
significance of the cash balance approach is that it would
have been less widely embraced had the Treasury not
explicitly approved cross-testing.
In particular, the Treasury Regulations, as part of their
safe harbor for cash balance arrangements, declare a cash
balance plan nondiscriminatory as to rank-and-file
employees"0 if, inter alia, the plan's theoretical individual
account allocations satisfy defined contribution standards
29. For that reason, defined contribution arrangements are also denoted as
individual account plans. See ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1994).
30. It bears emphasis that the regulations address the requirement of I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(4) that benefits or contributions not discriminate in favor of highly-
compensated employees, but are silent on the question of age discrimination.
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for nondiscrimination, i.e., if the plan's "hypothetical
allocations for all employees in the plan for all plan years .
. are the same percentage of plan year compensation or the
same dollar amount."3' Thus, in the case discussed earlier of
the thirty-five year old business owner earning $100,000
yearly and her fifty year old secretary making $30,000
annually, " a cash balance plan under which the pay credit
for each employee is 2% of salary (or any other constant
percentage) qualifies as nondiscriminatory even though, in
annuity terms, the younger, higher paid business owner
does substantially better as a percentage of current
compensation than does her secretary. While not all cash
balance plans utilize the regulations' cross-testing safe
harbor by providing a uniform pay credit for all employees,
many, perhaps most, do.
An important issue in the current controversy over cash
balance plans is whether such plans-permitted by the
regulations to cross-test for discrimination as to highly-
compensated employees-may test for age discrimination
via cross-testing. My analysis is that cross-testing for age
discrimination is sensible as a matter of policy, but that the
relevant statutes are insufficiently flexible to be construed
as permitting cross-testing for age discrimination.34 Others
disagree."
C. New Comparability Plans and Cross-Testing
In several respects, new comparability plans differ from
cash balance arrangements: while cash balance
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(c)(3)(iii)(B) (as amended in 2001).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
33. Some cash balance plans provide for a pay credit which increases as an
employee cohorts get older, for example, a 3% pay credit for employees in their
thirties, a 4% pay credit for employees in their forties, etc. This kind of formula
falls outside the regulatory safe harbor for cash balance plans since no uniform
percentage applies to all employees. In addition, another variant of cash
balance methodology, the pension equity plan, determines account balances in a
fashion which may fall outside the nondiscrimination safe harbor.
34. See Zelinsky, Cash Balance Controversy, supra note 1, at 733-48;
Zelinsky, Cash Balance Controversy Revisited, supra note 1.
35. Fred Williams, Discrimination Question Looms: Assumptions Color
Arguments About Conversion Fairness, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, June 26,
2000, at 22; see also Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp.2d 812 (S.D. Lad. 2000)
(holding that cash balance plan does not violate pension age discrimination




arrangements are defined benefit plans designed to look
like defined contribution pensions, new comparability
arrangements are defined contribution plans designed to be
tested for discrimination in defined benefit terms. Cash
balance plans have largely been embraced by large
employers; new comparability is essentially a small
employer phenomenon.7 However, both new comparability
and cash balance plans are best understood in the context
of the regulations' approval of cross-testing. 37
One version of the new comparability approach is
known as "superintegration." Generally, defined
contribution plans may integrate with social security, i.e.,
may provide for less employer contributions with respect to
the portion of each employee's salary which is below the
social security wage base and which is thus covered by
social security. The rationale for integration is that the
employer makes two pension contributions for
compensation covered by social security, the contribution to
the employer's plan plus the employer's Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) payment. Hence, the employer
can-consistent with the nondiscrimination norm-
contribute less to its qualified plan for social security
covered compensation because the employer pays FICA on
that amount. 8 However, the lower contribution rate is
limited to the employee compensation subject to social
security coverage. To the extent employees earn
compensation above the social security level, they must all
receive the same percentage contribution on that
noncovered compensation." In simplest terms, when social
36. See Press Release, American Society of Pension Actuaries, ASPA Survey
Confirms "New Comparability" Expands Small Business Retirement Plan
Coverage (May 17, 2000), available at http://www.aspa.org/archivepages/
gac2000/newcomppressrel.htm (on file with the Buffalo Law Review) ("New
Comparability Plans are Small Business Retirement Plans").
37. Because these plans have emerged relatively recently, the terminology is
this area has yet to be standardized. Some use the term "new comparability" to
refer only to category-based arrangements. See infra text accompanying note 50
(discussing categorization approach). My preference is to use the term "new
comparability" to refer to both such class-based plans and to superintegrated
arrangements and to contrast these with the kind of single formula, "age-
weighted" plans condoned in Notice 2000-14 and the recently-adopted Treasury
regulations. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-14, 2000-10 I.R.B. 737.
38. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 8, at 318-22.
39. I.R.C. § 401(l)(2) (1994).
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security coverage ends, higher employer-contribution rates
begin.
Superintegration formulas deliberately flout these rules
by establishing higher salary thresholds for larger
("integrated") contribution levels. Thus, higher plan
contribution rates do not start when social security
coverage ends but at some greater threshold. The result is
an allocation of resources which flunks nondiscrimination
standards in defined contribution terms (because it
provides lower contribution rates on salary exceeding the
social security coverage level) but which passes muster
when cross-tested by defined benefit criteria (by converting
employer contributions into projected annuity benefits).
To illustrate, consider a two-physician medical practice,
with a fifty-five year old doctor anxious to begin serious
retirement savings and a thirty-one year old physician with
a growing family, more interested in current income than in
ension coverage. Suppose the older physician earns
150,000 per year, the younger doctor earns $100,000
annually, and the practice has one other employee, a thirty-
one year old nurse who earns $30,000 per year. A
conventional integrated defined contribution pension plan
for this practice would provide both an employer
contribution of 5.7% of each employee's first $80,400 of
salary (the amount of salary covered by social security
contributions) and an employer contribution of 11.4% for
each employee's compensation in excess of $80,400 (such
excess being excluded from social security coverage). The
result of this formula is shown in Table 1.40
To continue this hypothetical, neither doctor is happy
with this possibility, as the older doctor wants greater
retirement savings while the younger doctor, pressed for
current income, wants less. Under a superintegrated
formula, the employer could contribute 2.823% of each
employee's first $100,000 of compensation and 54.354% of
each employee's compensation in excess of $100,000, as
illustrated in Table 2.
40. In this example, I use the 2001 social security coverage level ($80,400)
and the statutory integration rate (5.7%). Using these assumptions, the
integration formula of I.R.C. § 401(l)(2) permits as nondiscriminatory a defined
contribution formula under which the employer contributes 5.7% for the first
$80,400 of an employee's salary and double that amount (11.4%) for salary in
excess of $80,400.
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Table 1
employee annual salary pension contribution
55 year old physician $150,000 $12,51741
31 year old physician $100,000 $ 681742
31 year old nurse $ 30,000 $ 171043
Table 2
employee annual salary pension contribution
55 year old physician $150,000 $30,000'
31 year old physician $100,000 $ 282345
31 year old nurse $ 30,000 $ 84746
In defined contribution terms, this formula
discriminates as the highest paid employee (the fifty-five
year old doctor) receives a pension contribution which, as a
percentage of salary (20%) is roughly seven times the
comparable percentage (2.8%) for the nurse. However,
cross-tested for anticipated benefits, as shown in Table 3
below, this superintegrated plan passes muster because the
projected annuity each employee earns during this year is
41. ($80,400 x .057) + ($69,600 x .114) = $4582.80 + $7934.40 = $12,517.20.
42. ($80,400 x .057) + ($19,600 x .114) = $4582.80 + $2234.40 = $6817.20.
43. $30,000 x .057 = $1710. Since the nurse has no income in excess of the
social security base ($80,400), the nurse has no income subject to the higher
contribution rate of 11.4%.
44. ($100,000 x .02823) + ($50,000 x .54354) = $2823 + $27,177 = $30,000.
For 2001, $35,000 is the maximum contribution an employee may receive
annually under a defined contribution plan. See I.R.C. § 415(c)(1) (1994); I.R.S.
Notice 2000-66, 2000-52 I.R.B. 600.
45. $100,000 x .02823= $2823. Since this physician has no income in excess
of $100,000, he has no income subject to the higher contribution level, 54.354%.
If the younger physician is neither an officer nor an owner of the employer, he
must receive a slightly larger contribution, $3000. See I.R.C. § 416(i)(1) (1994 &
Supp. II 1996) (defining key employees); see also I.R.C. § 416(c)(2)(A) (1994)
(requiring 3% minimum contribution for non-key employees). In the interests of
simplicity, I have ignored this qualification which does not affect the substance
of the example. On the top-heavy rules of I.R.C. § 416, see U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF,
PRIVATE PENSIONS, 'ToP-HEAVY' RULES FOR OWNER-DOMINATED PLANS (2000).
46. $30,000 x .02823 = $847. Since the nurse has no income in excess of
$100,000, the nurse has no income subject to the higher contribution level,
54.354%. Technically, under § 416, the nurse's contribution must be rounded up
to $900. See I.R.C. § 416(i)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (defining key employees);
id. § 416(c)(2)(A) (1994) (requiring 3% minimum contribution for non-key
employees). In the interests of simplicity, I have ignored this qualification
which does not affect the substance of the example.
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the same percentage of the employee's compensation
(5.69%).
Table 3
employee annual salary projected annuity
55 year old physician $150,000 $853447
31 year old physician $100,000 $568948
31 year old nurse $ 30,000 $170749
Proponents of new comparability formulas argue that
this outcome is acceptable since it merely replicates,
through a defined contribution arrangement, a pattern of
pension resources deemed nondiscriminatory when
achieved through defined benefit methodology-an
argument I find convincing since I see no reason for the
form, rather than the substance, of pension allocations to be
of controlling significance.
Similar results could be obtained under a categorization
approach, i.e., by dividing all present and future employees
into three classes: for example, physicians age forty years
and older, all younger physicians, and all other personnel.
Under this categorization version of new comparability,
members of the class of older doctors (for now, a class of
one) would each receive plan contributions of 20% of current
salary, the younger physicians (also currently a category of
one) would receive contributions of 2.823% of compensation,
and the residual category of all of other employees (for now,
just the nurse) would also receive plan contributions of
2.823% of current salary. This approach produces the same
allocations as the superintegrated design and, like that
design, discriminates in defined contribution terms as the
fifty-five year old highly compensated doctor receives a plan
47. In ten years (when this physician is ready to retire at age sixty-five), the
physician's contribution of $30,000 will grow to $67,830 which, at a purchase
rate of $7.94833, will purchase $8534 of annual annuity income starting at
retirement. ($30,000) x (1.085)A1O = $67,830. $67,830/$7.94833 = $8534.
48. In thirty-four years (when this physician is ready to retire at age sixty-
five), the physician's contribution of $2823 will have grown to $45,219 which, at
a purchase rate of $7.94833, will purchase $5689 of annual annuity income
starting at retirement. ($2823) x (1.085)A34 = $45,219. $45,219/$7.94833 =
$5689.
49. In thirty-four years (when the nurse is ready to retire at age sixty-five),
the nurse's contribution of $847 will grow to $13,567 which, at a purchase rate
of $7.94833, will purchase $1707 of annual annuity income starting at
retirement. ($847) x (1.085)A34 = $13,567. $13,567/$7.94833 = $1707.
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allocation of 20% of his salary while the nurse receives a
plan allocation of only 2.823% of current compensation. On
the other hand, as we have seen, these allocations, when
cross-tested for projected annuities, pass muster in defined
benefit terms."
II. THE PROPRIETY OF CROSS-TESTING
A. The Arguments for Cross-Testing
The normative argument for cross-testing is
straightforward: the form through which qualified plan
allocations are achieved should not matter. As long as a
particular allotment of qualified plan resources is
nondiscriminatory in either defined contribution or defined
benefit terms, it is not relevant whether that allotment is
implemented through defined contribution or defined
benefit methodology.
The pragmatic argument for cross-testing is that,
absent cross-testing, employers, particularly small
employers, will not sponsor qualified plans or will sponsor
plans which are suboptimal. Consider again, in this context,
the choices confronting the older, highly compensated
physician under a conventional defined contribution plan."
That plan leaves the physician dissatisfied since he would
like to save more for his retirement. That plan also leaves
the younger doctor dissatisfied since he would like to save
less. Considering the legal, accounting, and administrative
costs of the plan, the older physician could well conclude
that the conventional defined contribution plan, if that is
his only alternative,53 is not worth the candle. The result
would be no qualified plan. 4
50. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
51. The fashion in which Professors Langbein and Wolk pose the issue
suggests the alternative connotations which can be attached to it. See LANGBEiN
& WOLK, supra note 8, at 317 ("Why should economically equivalent benefits be
discriminatory if provided through a defined contribution plan, but
nondiscriminatory if provided through a defined benefit plan?").
52. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
53. Implicit in this argument is the unavailability of a true defined benefit
plan. The factors deterring the physician from establishing a defined benefit
plan are discussed infra text accompanying notes 153-59.
54. The underlying premise of at least some cross-testing opponents is that
the doctor's failure to establish a qualified plan is a good thing or, at least,
nothing about which to be troubled. See infra Part II.E.
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The analysis in the cash balance setting, while
somewhat different, leads to similar conclusions. It is not
likely that a large employer, dissatisfied with its traditional
defined benefit pension plan, will terminate that plan and
eschew all pension coverage. Rather, if that employer does
not have the cash balance alternative, the realistic choice
will be the status quo of the traditional plan, the
termination of that plan and its replacement with a true
defined contribution arrangement such as a 401(k) plan, or
the embrace of such devices as stock options, stock
appreciation rights and nonqualified deferred compen-
sation.
Many commentators believe that the defined benefit
format, since it shifts investment risk to the employer, is for
many employees economically desirable in comparison with
defined contribution arrangements under which investment
risk (and reward) belong to the employees.55 From this
perspective, the cash balance alternative permits those
employers who would otherwise exit the defined benefit
regime to remain within it. Insofar as cross-testing
facilitates cash balance arrangements, such cross-testing
improves employees' retirement security by keeping alive
employers' commitment to provide employees with defined
benefits-rather than moving to the defined contribution
and nonqualified alternatives.
B. Notice 2000-14
To date, the most important critique of cross-testing is
Notice 2000-14,"8 in which the Treasury expresses its
misgivings about new comparability plans, misgivings
subsequently reflected in amendments to the Treasury
regulations."7 Although Notice 2000-14 is brief, four themes
emerge from it. First, Notice 2000-14 distinguishes between
good and bad cross-testing formulas. As an example of the
former, Notice 2000-14 condones a defined contribution
plan with a single track, "age-weighted" methodology under
which all employees (regardless of compensation levels)
accrue larger amounts as they get older or acquire greater
55. I am one of these. See also Alvin D. Lurie, Cash Balance Plans: Enigma
Variations, 85 TAX NOTES 503, 510 (1999).
56. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-14, 2000-10 I.R.B. 737.
57. See infra Part II.D.
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seniority.58 In contrast, the Notice criticizes the kind of
classification formulas discussed earlier 9 and indicts
superintegration designs" as well.
Second, the Notice defines the problem with these new
comparability devices as the fact that "by plan design, non-
highly compensated employees never have an opportunity
to earn the higher allocation rates as they work additional
years for the employer and grow older." Thus, in our
example of a new comparability categorization
arrangement,6' the Treasury's stated concern is that the
nurse is permanently consigned to a residual employee
classification receiving a plan contribution of 2.8% of
current salary and can never move into the older physician
class (receiving a 20% allocation)-unlike the young
physician who will age as a matter of course and thus some
day graduate to the more favorable classification.
Third, the Notice opines that plans of this sort cannot
"be reconciled with the basic purpose of the
nondiscrimination rules as applied to defined contribution
plans." Finally, the Treasury raises the issue of conversion:
when existing defined contribution plans are converted to
new comparability formulas, rank-and-file employees
typically see their allocation rates go down as a percentage
of salary while highly compensated participants see their
rates go up.
I find these arguments unconvincing. Notice 2000-14
never confronts the underlying issue of substance and form:
why is an allocation of pension resources which is permitted
in a defined benefit setting impermissible when
implemented through a defined contribution arrangement?
The drafters of Notice 2000-14 elide this question when
they suggest that cross-tested new comparability plans fail
"the basic purpose of the nondiscrimination rules as applied
to defined contribution plans." This, however, assumes
away the basic inquiry, i.e., whether defined contribution
arrangements must be scrutinized in defined contribution
terms.
Indeed, the Notice never informs us what the purpose of
the nondiscrimination provisions might be or what aspect of
that purpose is uniquely applied to defined contribution
58. See infra Part 1.C.
59. See supra text accompanying note 50.
60. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
61. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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arrangements. Perhaps the drafters of Notice 2000-14 view
as self-evident "the basic purpose of the nondiscrimination
rules as applied to defined contribution plans." If so, I
disagree.
The qualified plan rules are conventionally thought to
embody an expensive tax expenditure which can only be
justified if retirement benefits are channeled to rank-and-
file employees.62 I dissent from the premise that qualified
plan law constitutes a tax expenditure, concluding that the
Code provisions governing qualified pension and profit
sharing arrangements are consistent with normative tax
principles for measuring income.63 But even accepting the
premise that qualified plan law constitutes a tax
expenditure and even viewing the nondiscrimination norm
as a means of using that expenditure to guarantee
retirement benefits for non-highly compensated personnel,
the question of substance and form remains: Why must the
purpose of the qualified plan tax expenditure be measured
against defined contribution plans solely in contribution
terms and not in terms of projected benefits? Why does it
not satisfy the purposes of the nondiscrimination norm
when an individual account arrangement emulates an
outcome deemed nondiscriminatory when achieved via
defined benefit methodology? The drafters of Notice 2000-14
may have answers to these questions. If so, they have not
disclosed them.
This leaves us with the basic conundrum: Notice 2000-
14 excoriates new comparability plans for achieving, via
cross-testing, allocations of pension resources deemed
nondiscriminatory when accomplished through defined
benefit devices. Why should the form by which pension
allocations are implemented matter?
The Notice's observations about the categorization
approach are, at first blush, more convincing. It is true that,
62. See generally Norman P. Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A
Reply to Professor Zelinsky, 9 AM. J. TAx PoLY 225 (1991) (disagreeing with
Zelinsky's argument about qualified plans and tax expenditures).
63. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Policy v. Revenue Policy: Qualified Plans,
Tax Expenditures, and the Flat, Plan Level Tax, 13 VA. TAX REV. 591, 591
(1994); Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and Identifying Tax Expenditures:
A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AMi. J. TAX PoLt 257 (1991); Edward A.
Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status
Quo, 66 N. CAR. L. REV. 315, 317 (1988); James A. Wooten, The 'Original Intent'
of the Federal Tax Treatment of Private Pension Plans, 58 N.Y.U. INST. TAX'N at
7-2 (2000).
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when employees are classified along new comparability
lines, the rank-and-file participants (in our example, the
nurse) have no realistic possibility of reaching the category
receiving greater contributions' (in our example, older
physicians). On a second look, however, matters are less
clear.
Under the superintegrated approach, there is no formal
barrier to the nurse's eventual receipt of enough
compensation to trigger the higher contribution rate. In our
superintegration example, a nurse earning in excess of
$100,0006 will receive the same contribution on such excess
as the older physician. Thus, the Notice's critique of
classifications unattainable by rank-and-file participants is,
at least formally, inapplicable to superintegrated plans,
which plans, however, Notice 2000-14 lumps together with
new comparability classification arrangements.
The logical retort is that, as a substantive matter, the
nurse is unlikely ever to earn more than $100,000 and, if he
did, the plan could then well be amended to elevate the
salary threshold for greater contributions, thereby
depriving the nurse of the larger contributions. Thus, in
substance, the nurse, under superintegration, has no more
practical likelihood of reaching the compensation level
which triggers greater contribution rates than of going to
medical school and becoming a senior physician of the
practice, eligible for greater contributions under the new
comparability classification approach.
The problem with this retort is that it proves too much,
since it applies with equal force to a conventional defined
benefit plan.66 The nurse is never likely to earn the same
salary as the physician and is thus never likely to accrue, in
the defined benefit context, pension resources like the
physician's. In theory, the nurse may remain employed long
enough that the economics of conventional defined benefit
plans favoring older employees start to favor the nurse.
However, given current patterns of employee mobility,67
64. While the nurse could theoretically go to medical school, that is a slim
reed on which to base a defense of this new comparability plan.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49.
66. See id.
67. Those looking at historical data tend to discount reports of increased
worker mobility while those looking at contemporary data generally confirm the
perception of an increasingly mobile workforce. See Zelinsky, Cash Balance
Controversy, supra note 1, at 709; see also Employee Retention Growing Problem
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there is at best a small possibility that the thirty-one year
old nurse will remain with this employer long enough to
accrue benefits at older ages.
In sum, the ultimate sin of category-based cross-testing
is its candor in disclosing the economic reality that the
nurse will not earn benefits like the older physician.
Economically equivalent results occur under defined benefit
formulas which produce minimal current contributions for
the younger nurse and which are unlikely to yield
significant benefits for the nurse in the future in light of the
likelihood that the nurse will change jobs or that the
employer will cease to exist upon the physician's
retirement. This brings us again to the central question: is
there a reason to condemn defined contribution allocations
of pension resources which are in substance economically
equivalent to those allocations achieved via defined benefit
plans?
Moreover, this line of thought exposes further
analytical weakness in Notice 2000-14 which lumps
together new comparability categorization plans and
superintegrated arrangements without explaining why they
should be treated the same. The Notice's critique of
category-based plans-rank-and-file employees will not
graduate to the more favorable categories-does not, as a
formal matter, apply to superintegrated plans, under
which, in theory, any employee can earn the amount needed
to trigger greater contribution rates. If the rationale for
linking category and superintegrated plans is that in
practice they produce economically equivalent results, we
again confront the reality that defined benefit plans
produce such results also. Why, then, condemn in the name
of economic substance defined contribution arrangements
which mimic defined benefit plans?
In complaining about the conversion of conventional
defined contribution plans to new comparability formats,
Notice 2000-14 echoes concerns raised in the cash balance
For Employers, SHRM Survey Finds, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, July 7,
2000. Even those skeptical of the argument that mobility is increasing in the
work place must doubt that the thirty-one year old nurse in this example will
remain in his present position long enough to accrue significant benefits under
a defined benefit arrangement. See, e.g., Martin A. Corry, AARP Criticizes New
Comparability Plans, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 6, 2000, at 2000 TNT 130-59




context. In that context also, a major complaint has been
that older employees, on the verge of accruing substantial
retirement and early retirement benefits, are deprived by
cash balance conversions of their expectation that they
would earn such benefits. 8
And the analysis of conversions and disappointed
expectations is the same in the new comparability context:69
As a matter of law, an employee has a right to benefits
accrued to date under existing pension formulas; an
employee has no right to any particular pension formula
going forward." As a matter of psychology, employees' sense
of betrayal when pension formulas change is widespread
and deeply-held. Employers interested in reasonable
relationships with their workforces are well-advised to
acknowledge that psychological reality. It is, however, one
thing to say that enlightened employers ought to recognize
the reality of employees' psychological expectations in the
pension status quo; it is another to say that there is (or
should be) a legal basis for those expectations.
C. "Good" Cross-Testing: Age-Weighted Formulas
The most provocative pronouncement of Notice 2000-14
(mirrored in the new regulations71 ) is the asserted
distinction between good and bad cross-testing." Under
Notice 2000-14, good cross-testing occurs when a single set
of contribution rates is available to all employees as they
age and acquire greater seniority. Notice 2000-14 thus
condones defined contribution plans typically denoted as
"age-weighted," plans which, without superintergration or
categorization of employees, mimic defined benefit results
by increasing contributions as employees age. However,
Notice 2000-14's approval is conditioned upon all employees
having the chance to earn along a single age-based track
the same higher contribution rates as the employees grow
older.
68. Zelinsky, Cash Balance Controversy, supra note 1, at 695-704.
69. Id. at 754-57.
70. An important qualification is that, in a collective bargaining context, an
employer may not be able to change pension plans unilaterally.
71. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
72. This assertion is also reflected in the new regulations which distinguish
between age-weighted defined contribution plans (i.e., good cross-testing) and
new comparability formulas (i.e., bad cross-testing). See infra Part II.D.
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Notice 2000-14's distinction between good and bad
cross-testing ultimately proves unpersuasive. An initial
observation is that in some, perhaps many, cases a single
track age-weighted formula, condoned by Notice 2000-14,
can produce the same results as the new comparability
designs attacked in Notice 2000-14. Returning to the three
participant example (a fifty-five year old physician and two
thirty-one year olds, a physician and a nurse), suppose that
the employer's defined contribution plan, like most age-
weighted formulas, uses a years-to-retirement factor which
increases each year as the participant ages. Suppose in
particular that the employer under its defined contribution
plan contributes for each employee a percentage of salary
determined by multiplying 45.22% times a years-to-
retirement factor increasing each year as the employee gets
older. The result of this age-weighted approach for the
current year is precisely the same as the outcome under
either the superintegrated or new comparability
classification alternative, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4
employee annual salary pension contribution
55 year old physician $150,000 $30,0007"
31 year old physician $100,000 $ 282374
31 year old nurse $ 30,000 $ 84775
Why is this an acceptable outcome under Notice 2000-
14 when accomplished by a single track, age-weighted
formula but is not an acceptable result when implemented
under either the superintegrated or categorization method?
According to the Notice, the flaw of the categorization
approach (which, in this case, achieves the same allocation
currently as the age-weighted design) is that it never grants
the nurse the same allocation rate as the physicians. In
contrast, under the age-weighted formula, as the nurse gets
older, his years-to-retirement factor will grow just like the
73. $150,000 x .4522 x .442285 = $30,000.
74. $100,000 x .4522 x .062429 = $2823. I.R.C. § 416 increases this
contribution to $3000 if the younger physician is neither an officer nor an owner
of the employer. See I.R.C. § 416 (1994 & Supp. I 1996). This qualification does
not change the substance of this example.
75. $30,000 x .4522 x .062429 = $847. Under I.R.C. § 416, this contribution
in practice must be rounded up to $900. See I.R.C. § 416 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
This qualification does not change the substance of this example.
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physicians'. When the nurse is age fifty-five, the nurse's
years-to-retirement factor will be precisely the same as the
factor used currently by the older doctor at age fifty-five.
Thus, in the year the nurse turns fifty-five, assuming the
nurse is still earning $30,000 annually,"6 the nurse will
receive a contribution of $6000."7 This contribution will
represent the same 20% of current compensation as the
senior physician received at age fifty-five. Consequently, an
age-weighted cross-tested allocation is, according to the
Treasury, acceptable today because the formula has a single
track which, in this example, will in the future work to the
nurse's benefit as he gets older.
How realistic is the prospect that, under this age-
weighted plan, the thirty-one year old nurse really will in
twenty-four years earn the same contribution rate as does
the fifty-five year old physician today? Not very. In this
example, there is a strong possibility that, when the
physician now age fifty-five reaches normal retirement age
in ten years, he will close the practice and terminate the
plan-if he doesn't do so sooner. In that case the nurse, as
he ages those ten years, will, under the age-weighted
approach condoned in Notice 2000-14, receive increasing
contributions each year-but he will never reach the age-
based contribution rates of the senior physician. Indeed, as
the nurse ages, so does the physician, so that the plan's
highest years-to-retirement factor proves to be a moving
target for the nurse: As the factor increases for the nurse, it
also increases for the doctor.
Moreover, given current patterns of employee mobility,
it is unlikely that the nurse will in fact remain with the
employer for the ten years until the doctor retires, let alone
the twenty-four years until the nurse's fifty-fifth birthday.
In short, the prospect that the nurse will, under this age-
weighted formula, accrue contributions at older ages in
emulation of the senior physician, while possible in theory,
is not great in practice, given the likelihood of the plan
terminating and of the nurse switching jobs.
In this context, the tension between form and substance
recurs. If single track, age-weighted plans are acceptable
because in form rank-and-file employees may remain in
employment as they grow older and thus theoretically
76. This is an oversimplification which is heuristically useful in this context.
77. $30,000 x .4522 x .442285 = $6000. $6000/$30,000 = 20%.
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receive the plan's higher contribution rates as they age, the
same formalistic defense applies to superintegrated plans
since, in theory, all employees may in the future see their
earnings rise to the level necessary to trigger higher
contribution rates under superintegrated arrangements. If,
on the other hand, the Treasury's objection to new
comparability plans is premised on economic substance-
rank-and-file employees will in practice receive little under
categorized or superintegrated arrangements-the same is
true under the age-weighted formulas approved in Notice
2000-14, to say nothing of conventional defined benefit
plans, neither of which is criticized in Notice 2000-14.
The Treasury's distinction between new comparability
and age-weighted formulas appears stronger if this example
is changed to add to the staff a fifty-five year old nurse who,
like his younger colleague, earns $30,000. In that case, the
allocation under either the superintegrated or the new
comparability categorization approaches is illustrated in
Table 5.
Table 5
employee annual salary pension contribution
55 year old physician $150,000 $30,000"s
31 year old physician $100,000 $ 2823"
55 year old nurse $ 30,000 $ 8478031 year old nurse $ 30,000 $ 847 8
However, under the age-weighted formula, the fifty-five
year old nurse does much better. Table 6 shows that the
contribution the older nurse receives under the age-
weighted formula condoned by Notice 2000-14 ($6000) is
substantially larger than his contribution under new
comparability methodologies ($847).
78. Under the categorization method, $150,000 x 20% = $30,000. Under the
superintegrated approach, ($100,000 x .02823) + ($50,000 x .54354) = $2823 +
$27,177 = $30,000.
79. Under the categorization method, $100,000 x .02823 = $2823. Under the
superintegrated approach, ($100,000 x .02823) = $2823.
80. Under the categorization method, $30,000 x .02823 = $847. Under the
superintegrated approach, ($30,000 x .02823) = $847.
81. Under the categorization method, $30,000 x .02823 = $847. Under the
superintegrated approach, ($30,000 x .02823) = $847.
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Table 6
employee annual salary pension contribution
55 year old physician $150,000 $30,0002
31 year old physician $100,000 $ 282383
55 year old nurse $ 30,000 $ 
600084
31 year old nurse $ 30,000 $ 84785
Moreover, in this example, the new comparability
approach cannot be defended via defined benefit
equivalence since the equivalent defined benefit plan would
not pass muster under the nondiscrimination norm. When
we project each employee's new comparability contribution
into an anticipated annuity benefit, the older nurse's
annuity is a disproportionately small percentage of his
current compensation, as shown in Table 7.
Table 7
employee annual annuity projected annuity
salary as % of salary
55 year old physician $150,000 $85348 5.69%87
31 year old physician $100,000 $568988 5.69%
89
55 year old nurse $ 30,000 $ 24190 0.80%91
31 year old nurse $ 30,000 $170792 5.69%
93
In defined benefit terms, this new comparability plan
flunks the nondiscrimination test since the non-highly
compensated nurse age fifty-five has only ten years to
retirement. Consequently, his new comparability
contribution ($847) has relatively little time for investment
growth and will thus not ripen into a retirement annuity
82. $150,000 x .4522 x .442285 = $30,000.
83. $100,000 x .4522 x .062429 = $2823.
84. $30,000 x .4522 x .442285 = $6000.
85. $30,000 x .4522 x .062429 = $847.
86. See supra note 47.
87. $8534/$150,000 = 5.69%.
88. See supra note 48.
89. $5689/$100,000 = 5.69%.
90. In ten years (when this nurse is ready to retire at age sixty-five), the
nurse's contribution of $847 will have grown to $1915 which, at a purchase rate
of $7.94833, will purchase $241 of annual annuity income starting at
retirement. ($847) x (1.085)A1O = $1915. $1915/$7.94833 = $241.
91. $241/$30,000 = 0.80%.
92. See supra note 49.
93. $1707/$30,000 = 5.69%.
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comparable to that earned by the other participants in the
plan who either have more years of investment growth
before retirement (the thirty-one year old nurse and
physician) or receive a substantially larger contribution as
a percentage of salary (the fifty-five year old physician).
However, by adding two more thirty-one year old
nurses to this hypothetical workforce, the new
comparability formula passes muster in defined benefit
terms despite the small annuity accrued by the older nurse.
Consider now a six participant plan with the addition of two
more thirty-one year old nurses. This example is illustrated
in Table 8.
Table 8
employee annual annuity projected annuity
salary as % of salary
55 year old physician $150,000 $85349' 5.69%
95
31 year old physician $100,000 $568996 5.69%
9
7
55 year old nurse $ 30,000 $ 24198 0.80%
99
31 year old nurse A $ 30,000 $1707100 5.69%
101
31 year old nurse B $ 30,000 $1707"2 5.69%103
31 year old nurse C $ 30,000 $1707114 5.69%105
In this example, the new comparability plan, translated
into its defined benefit equivalent, is deemed
nondiscriminatory under the rate group methodology of the
Treasury Regulations' 6 since nurses A, B, and C, who
represent three of the employer's four rank-and-file
94. See supra note 47.
95. See supra note 87.
96. See supra note 48.
97. $5689/$100,000 = 5.69%.
98. In ten years (when this nurse is ready to retire at age sixty-five), the
nurse's contribution of $847 will have grown to $1915 which, at a purchase rate
of $7.94833, will purchase $241 of annual annuity income starting at
retirement. ($847) x (1.085)A1O = $1915. $1915/$7.94833 = $241.
99. $241/$30,000 = 0.80%.
100. See supra note 49.
101. See supra note 93.
102. See supra note 49.
103. See supra note 93.
104. See supra note 49.
105. See supra note 93.
106. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(4)-2(c)(3), 1.401(a)(4)-3(c) (as amended in
1993); see also MCGILL ET AL., supra note 5, at 79-83; LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra
note 8, at 304-11.
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employees, accrue annuity benefits which, as a percentage
of current compensation, reach the same annuity to salary
ratio (5.69%) as do the projected annuity benefits earned by
the two physicians. In this example, there are two rate
groups: one for the older physician and one for the younger
physician. Each such group consists of the two physicians
and the three (younger) nurses with the same projected
annuity rate (5.69% of salary). Since the three thirty-one
year old nurses constitute more than 70% of the overall
non-highly compensated group (the four nurses), this plan
is nondiscriminatory under the rate group methodology. In
this example, the minimal contribution to the older nurse
under new comparability methodologies complies with the
nondiscrimination norm because a group of younger nurses
(comprising more than 70% of the practice's non-highly
compensated employees) earn significant benefits in
annuity terms.
To summarize, Notice 2000-14's distinction between
good and bad cross-testing is not convincing. First, a single
track, age-weighted formula of the sort condoned by the
Notice can in many cases produce the same results as the
new comparability methodologies the Notice attacks.
Second, the Notice's defense of good cross-testing-under
"good" formulas, rank-and-file participants can theoretically
earn in the future at the same higher contribution rates
available to highly compensated employees-is
unpersuasive since, in practice, younger employees are
unlikely to participate in plans long enough to earn these
higher rates. Finally, the "bad" results achieved by the new
comparability methodologies, when converted into their
defined benefit equivalents, can pass muster in defined
benefit terms. This, again, brings us back to the central
issue unaddressed in Notice 2000-14: Why should an
allocation of pension resources considered
nondiscriminatory in defined benefit terms be verboten
when implemented via a defined contribution plan?
D. The New Amendments to the Cross-Testing Regulations:
The Enigma of Double Testing
On June 29, 2001, the Treasury adopted amendments
to the cross-testing regulations to restrict new
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comparability formulas.' Not surprisingly, the new
amendments reflect many of the same concerns as Notice
2000-14. Also not surprisingly, the new amendments
embody the same analytical limitations as Notice 2000-14.
Central to these amendments is the double testing of hybrid
defined contribution plans like new comparability
arrangements: after proving nondiscriminatory on the basis
of their projected benefits, under the new regulations, such
hybrid plans must also satisfy additional rules as to their
contributions. The logical and statutory bases for this
double testing are weak.
Echoing Notice 2000-14, the Treasury's preamble to the
regulations' amendments questions "whether new
comparability and similar plans are consistent with the
basic purpose of the nondiscrimination rules under §
401(a)(4)." Also like Notice 2000-14, the Treasury's
preamble never tells us what that purpose might be or why
it might be bad for defined contribution plans to mirror the
distribution patterns of defined benefit arrangements.
To limit new comparability arrangements, the new
amendments introduce three new concepts to the
regulations governing the cross-testing of individual
account arrangements: "broadly available allocation
rates,"1 8  "smoothly increasing schedule of allocation- ,,109 " ii
rates, and "minimum allocation gateway.""0
Under the amendments, a defined contribution formula
has "broadly available allocation rates" if, for the current
year, each contribution rate under the plan is available to a
group of employees satisfying the coverage requirements of
I.R.C. § 410(b)."' Thus, in our earlier example, 2 the 20%
contribution rate for the older physician is not broadly
available within the meaning of the amendments since that
rate applies to only a single, highly-compensated employee
107. 66 Fed. Reg. 34,535 (June 29, 2001) (amending Treas. Reg. §
1.401(a)(4)-8); see also IRS Releases Proposed Regs on New Comparability
Plans, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 6, at 2000 TNT 195-4. The proposed changes
take effect for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2002.
108. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(iii)(A), 66 Fed. Reg. 34,535, 34,540-
41.
109. See id. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(iii)(B), 66 Fed. Reg. 34,535, 34,541.
110. See id. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(iv), 66 Fed. Reg. 34,535, 34,542.
111. Such compliance must be measured without resort to the average
benefit percentage test of I.R.C. § 410(b)(2) (1994).
112. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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and to no non-highly compensated employees.1  And, for
these purposes, it is irrelevant that, in defined benefit
terms, the older physician's higher contribution is
equivalent to the contribution for the lower paid nurse.11
If an allocation rate is broadly available, the inquiry
under the amendments ends. If, however, an allocation rate
is not broadly available (as will often be the case under new
comparability methodologies), the plan must comply with
the minimum allocation gateway. To pass this gateway,
each non-highly compensated employee in the plan must
receive contributions equal to the greater of 5% of the
employee's compensation or one-third of the highly
compensated employee's contribution rate.1 ' Thus, to
continue the example, the employer, under the
amendments, either must abandon the new comparability
plan (because the 20% rate is not broadly available) or must
increase the nurse's contribution to 5% of his salary (to pass
the minimum allocation gateway)."6 These rules effectively
mandate for the nurse a higher contribution which, in
defined benefit terms, gives the nurse a benefit
proportionately greater relative to his salary than the
projected benefit for the older physician."'
113. The older doctor is one of two highly-compensated employees, the other
being the younger physician. No non-highly compensated employees benefit
from the higher allocation rate. Hence, that rate flunks as too narrowly
available since the percentage of highly-compensated employees benefiting from
that rate (50%) is impermissibly greater than the percentage of non-highly
compensated employees benefiting from that rate (0%). See Treas. Reg. §
1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(viii), ex.3, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,535, 34,543 (June 29, 2001).
114. Under the amendments, a cross-tested defined contribution plan must
pass muster in defined benefit terms and must also comply with the new
contribution-testing requirements of the amendments. See id. § 1.401(a)(4)-
8(b)(1)(i), 66 Fed. Reg. 34,535, 34,540.
115. Id. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(iv), 66 Fed. Reg. 34,535, 34,541. If there is more
than one highly compensated employee, the one-third test applies to the
allocation rate of the highly compensated employee with the highest rate. See
id.
116. If the allocation rate for the highly compensated doctor were 12%, the
minimum gateway contribution required for the nurse would be one-third of
that figure, i.e., 4% of salary.
117. The 5% contribution mandated by the new amendments to the cross-
testing regulations will become an annuity of $3023 upon the nurse's
retirement. ($1500) x (1.085)A34 = $24,027. $24,027/$7.94844 = $3023. Thus, in
defined benefit terms, the nurse's incremental benefit is slightly over 10% of his
salary of $30,000 ($3023/$30,000) while the doctor's projected additional benefit
for the year is 5.69% of his salary.
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Finally, the recently-adopted amendments to the cross-
testing regulations, like Notice 2000-14, condone a single
track, age-weighted formula,"' but only if that formula
constitutes a "smoothly increasing schedule of allocation
rates.""' For these purposes, the formula must utilize "age
band(s)' 12 with "regular intervals,"2' for example, the same
contribution rate for employees grouped by five year
cohorts. 22 As to each such "age band," the contribution rate
for that band cannot be more than five percentage points
higher than the rate for the immediately prior band and in
no event may the contribution rate for any age band be
more than double the rate for the immediately prior band.'23
The amendments to the cross-testing regulations
illustrate these rules via an age-weighted formula under
which employees are grouped into ten year bands (for
example, all employees ages twenty-five to thirty-four
receive the same contribution as a percentage of salary) and
under which each older band has a contribution rate which
is 3% higher than the age band before (for example
employees ages twenty-five to thirty-four get contributions
of 6% of salary while younger employees get contributions
of 3% of compensation, and each member of the band from
ages thirty-five to forty-four receives contributions of 9% of
compensation). 
124
Thus, as a practical matter, the amendments generally
condition new comparability, in either its category or
superintegrated form, upon the non-highly compensated
employees receiving the new minimum gateway
allocation.25 However, many, perhaps most, age-weighted
formulas continue to pass muster under these amendments.
As a theoretical matter, the new amendments require cross-
tested defined contribution plans to be double tested, i.e., to
118. The recently-adopted amendments also permit service-weighted




121. See id. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(iii)(C), 66 Fed. Reg. 34,535, 34,541.
122. See id. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(iv), ex.2, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,535, 34,542-43.
Presumably, annually increasing allocation rates pass muster because each
individual year is its own age band.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. I am skeptical that many new comparability formulas will, in practice,
prove "broadly available" within the meaning of the proposed amendments.
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be nondiscriminatory as to projected benefits and, in
contribution terms, also to have allocation rates which are
either "broadly available" or supplemented by the minimum
allocation gateway. 6
It is difficult to reconcile the double testing mandate of
the amendments with the disjunctive language of the Code.
Under § 401(a)(4), plans may not discriminate as to
"contributions or benefits."27  In contrast, for hybrid
individual account arrangements, the amendments require
nondiscrimination both as to benefits and, in modified form,
as to contributions.
It is, moreover, unclear as a matter of policy why cross-
tested defined contribution plans should, per the recently-
adopted amendments, be double tested as to both their
contributions and their benefits when other types of
qualified plans are not double tested in this fashion but are,
instead, assessed in terms of either their contributions or
their benefits. Consider again a conventional defined
benefit plan which allocates pension resources among
participants in the same manner as an equivalent new
comparability plan. Under such a defined benefit plan,
contributions are proportionately greater for older
employees but projected benefits are deemed
nondiscriminatory.' As a matter of policy, the double
testing approach embodied in the new amendments to the
cross-testing regulations implies that there is something
wrong with this defined benefit plan, that, notwithstanding
the nondiscriminatory nature of the plan's projected
benefits, additional hurdles must be satisfied as to the
plan's pattern of contributions.
There is, however, no indication that the Treasury
intends to apply this double testing approach to
conventional defined benefit plans, nor does there appear to
be any statutory basis for testing conventional defined
126. A prominent Treasury official is reported to have characterized the new
regulations as "layerling]" a second nondiscrimination test onto new
comparability plans. See Bonner Menking, IRS Officials Discuss Forthcoming
Employee Benefits Guidance, 89 TAx NOTEs 712 (2000) ("Richard Wickersham,
manager of the IRS Employee Plans Technical Guidance and Quality Assurance
Group, described the [then] proposed new comparability regulations as 'a test
layered on top of the current cross-testing rules.' "); see also supra note 107. I
see no substantive difference between the characterization of the new
regulations as layering or, as I prefer, double testing.
127. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994) (emphasis added).
128. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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benefit plans as to both their benefits and their
contributions. 129 This highlights the questions of policy and
statutory construction raised by the amendments: Why, as
a matter of policy, should a hybrid defined contribution
plan be double tested as to both its benefits and its
contributions when an economically similar defined benefit
arrangement is tested only as to its projected benefits?
Where, as a statutory matter, does the Treasury derive
authority for the double testing approach of the proposed
new cross-testing regulations?
The first inquiry poses again the issue of substance and
form: insofar as new comparability formulas mimic the
results of pension resources achievable via conventional
defined benefit plans, there is no apparent reason to
disfavor those results when accomplished via a defined
contribution arrangement. Moreover, as a statutory matter,
there is no textual basis for conditioning the cross-testing of
defined contribution arrangements on a benefits basis upon
the additional satisfaction of the contribution requirements
of the proposed amendments.
It is instructive, in this context, to reconsider the newminimum gateway requirement, i.e., non-highly
compensated employees covered by new comparability
plans without broadly available allocation rates must
instead receive contributions of 5% of salary or one-third of
the contribution rate of the plan's highly compensated
employee. In particular, it is instructive to compare this
requirement with similar formulas for top-heavy plans and
certain safe harbor 401(k) plans. As to the former, "non-key
employees" must receive contributions equal to the lesser of
3% of salary or the contribution rate for the plan's key
employee.' As to the latter, non-highly compensated
participants must receive employer contributions equal to
3% of compensation."' These top-heavy and 401(k) formulas
were the apparent models for the new regulatory "gateway,"
but are mandated statutorily. No one has suggested that
the Treasury had the regulatory authority to impose these
top-heavy and 401(k) requirements on its own. Where, then,
does the Treasury find its authority to impose such
requirements on hybrid defined contribution plans?
129. Section 401(a)(4) mandates nondiscrimination as to "contributions or
benefits," not both. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994).
130. I.R.C. § 416(c)(2) (1994).
131. Id. § 401(k)(12)(C) (Supp. II 1996).
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As I noted earlier, the disjunctive terminology of I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(4) ("contributions or benefits") is difficult to square
with the double testing approach of the new amendments
(which effectively read the statute as mandating
nondiscrimination as to "contributions and benefits"). Such
an approach, if applied to conventional defined benefit and
defined contribution arrangements, would wreak little short
of havoc-which is why the Treasury is unlikely to go this
far.
The preamble to the amendments unpersuasively
invokes § 415(b)(6)(A), which authorizes Treasury
Regulations governing the "computation of benefits under a
defined contribution plan." However, the new cross-testing
amendments go beyond mere computation and impose
substantive minimum requirements, requirements which,
as to top-heavy and 401(k) plans, were imposed
legislatively, not through regulations.
E. The Real Target: Small Plans
The analytical weaknesses of Notice 2000-14 and of the
recently-adopted amendments suggest a deeper, unstated
basis for opposition to new comparability formulas. My
appraisal is that most, if not all, new comparability
opponents dislike all small employer plans, viewing them as
tax shelters for the affluent which drain the fisc and
mistreat rank-and-file workers.' From this perspective,
new comparability is simply the most recent abuse to be
combated. From this vantage, it is no great loss, and
possibly a boon, if the typical small employer elects against
a qualified plan, since that plan would deplete the Treasury
with no compensating increase in retirement security for
non-highly compensated employees.
However, in their opposition to new comparability
formulas, these critics find themselves constrained in three
ways. First, the Treasury regulations specifically authorize
the cross-testing which the new comparability
methodologies utilize. Second, the failure in 1994 of efforts
to outlaw age-weighted formulas3 indicates that, as a
132. In the current climate, it confuses, rather than clarifies, to label small
plans as "tax shelters" since these plans have economic substance. See infra
note 142 and accompanying text.
133. See Barry J. Bidjarano, Coping with the Reduced Limitation on
"Compensation" Used Under Qualified Retirement Plans, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
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political matter, opposition must be focused upon the new
comparability approaches; hence, the unpersuasive, but
politically necessary, distinction between "good" cross-
testing in the form of single track, age-weighted formulas
and "bad" cross-testing in the form of superintegrated and
categorized new comparability plans.
Finally, while overregulation has, as a practical matter,
killed the small defined benefit pension, the
nondiscrimination norm remains on the books for small
plans, legitimating the defined benefit distribution of
pension resources favoring older, long-term employees.'
The statutory authority to test for discrimination in terms
of projected benefits thereby provides a baseline against
which new comparability achieves, by different forms, the
same substance as do defined benefit formulas.
Given these constraints, it is not surprising that the
critique of new comparability is unconvincing, a piecemeal
attack on a single type of plan which ignores other pension
arrangements implementing the same results. The
piecemeal nature of that attack undermines its
persuasiveness: it is difficult to understand what is so
terrible about new comparability formulas when, in
substance, they achieve the same results as conventional
defined benefit pensions and single track, age-weighted
plans.
F. Revisiting Substance and Form
To summarize: opposition to cross-testing in general
and to new comparability in particular is analytically
insecure as long as the issue is framed in terms of
substance and form. There is no reason why a distribution
of pension resources substantively acceptable when effected
through the defined benefit motif should be deemed
discriminatory when accomplished via the defined
contribution form. Similarly, there is no reason why defined
contribution-style allocations become inappropriate when
implemented by means of defined benefit arrangements.
357, 400 (1994); see also GRAFF, supra note 2 ("In 1994, Treasury made a
legislative proposal to prohibit 'cross-testing' which was soundly defeated.").
134. The tendency of defined benefit plans to favor older, more senior
workers is commonly denoted as "backloading." See Zelinsky, Cash Balance
Controversy, supra note 1, at 688-91.
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Could, however, opponents of cross-testing and new
comparability challenge the notion that the issue is merely
one of form? Could they instead contend that there are
reasons to restrict the distributional patterns of defined
benefit plans to such plans and not permit similar outcomes
through defined contribution arrangements?
An argument along these lines would start with the
widely-accepted premises that qualified plans receive tax-
favored treatment and that the only rationale for such
treatment is to encourage and reward employers who
provide adequate retirement income for rank-and-file
employees." 5  Starting from these premises, such an
argument would then cite the advantages to employees of
defined benefit arrangements, in particular, the security
arising from the employer's guarantee of a specified
retirement income. Finally, the argument would conclude,
it is a fair bargain to give the employer the distributional
advantages of a defined benefit plan (greater contributions
for older participants) but only when the employer extends
to its employees the greater security of a defined benefit.136
Cross-testing gives the employer the advantages of the
defined benefit motif-pension resources favoring older,
typically highly compensated, participants-without
obligating the employer to provide rank-and-file workers
with a specified benefit. 7
This criticism sweeps more broadly than Notice 2000-14
and the new regulations since it indicts all cross-testing of
defined contribution plans on the ground that defined
benefit-type distributions of pension resources, more
favorable to older workers, should only be permitted when
the employer guarantees specified benefits. Notice 2000-14
and the recently-adopted regulations, in contrast, indicate
that single track, age-weighted formulas pass muster.
135. See Stein, supra note 62.
136. Of course, the distributional pattern of defined benefit plans, favoring
older workers, is only deemed an advantage when the employer seeks greater
pension resources for such older workers. This will often be the case for
professional and other closely-held employers. However, much of the impetus
behind conversion to the cash balance format is the reduction of contributions
for older participants to decrease the employer's costs, to increase contributions
for younger employees-or both.
137. One opponent of new comparability has alluded to an argument along
these lines. See, e.g., Corry, supra note 67 ("Importing only a defined benefit
testing method to a defined contribution plan without transferring other
important safeguards leaves plan participants short-changed.").
612 [Vol. 49
IS CROSS-TESTING A MISTAKE?
Indeed, the argument I postulate reflects a
fundamentally different orientation than do Notice 2000-14
and the new regulations. The Notice and regulations
criticize new comparability as inconsistent with the
purposes of defined contribution plans. The argument I
posit criticizes new comparability as inconsistent with the
purposes of defined benefit arrangements.
For five reasons, I am ultimately unpersuaded by this
contention that defined benefit-style allocations of pension
resources should, as a substantive matter, be limited to
defined benefit plans. First, the premise that qualified plan
law constitutes a tax expenditure, while widely accepted, is
unconvincing."8 Without that premise, it is difficult to
justify much of the regulation of qualified plans, regulation
rationalized on the grounds that it controls and channels
the putative tax subsidy to qualified plans. If there is, as I
believe, no qualified plan tax expenditure, there is no basis
for tying a particular version of that expenditure (defined
benefit-style allocations favoring older workers) to specific
kinds of plans (true defined benefit arrangements).
Second, while many believe that the employer's
assumption of the risks and obligations of providing fixed
pension payments makes defined benefit plans important
devices for providing retirement income,"' in the current
environment, many others view defined benefit plans as
dinosaurs. In a prolonged bull market, defined benefit
arrangements appear to many, not as boons to the
employee, but as banes which capture superior investment
performance for the employer rather than for the
employees. Of course, a sustained bear market will reveal
to many participants, now used to soaring 401(k) and IRA
accounts, the advantages of defined benefit arrangements
under which they have fixed claims. 4 ' For now, however,
many would reject the notion that defined benefit plans are
something good for them. 4 Without that notion, it makes
138. See sources cited supra note 63.
139. See supra note 55.
140. E. Philip Davis reports such a phenomenon in the United Kingdom
during the 1970s. See E. PHMIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS 63 (1995) (In the United
Kingdom, "[o]ccupational defined-contribution plans declined in popularity
during the mid-1970s, an era of high inflation and low real rates of return to
investment.").
141. It is important to emphasize that for many (if not most) of us concerned
about the stagnation of defined benefit plans, the issue is balance. Just as I am
concerned about a world in which many private sector employees rely solely
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little sense to force employers to establish defined benefit
plans by limiting defined benefit-style allocations, favoring
older workers, to defined benefit plans.
Third, an indictment of cross-testing along the lines I
have postulated ultimately reflects the policy of ERISA and
the legislation which has followed ERISA and further
tightened the regulation of defined benefit plans.
Heightened regulation has played an important role in the
demise of small employer defined benefit plans and in the
stagnation of such plans among larger sponsors. For those
who believe that this regulation has gone overboard,
limiting defined benefit-style allocations to defined benefit
plans represents more Rube Goldberg regulation of a
system already overregulated. The appropriate course
ought not be restrictions to coerce employers into the
defined benefit regime, but deregulation to resuscitate
defined benefit pensions.
Fourth, the argument I posit, like opposition to small
employer plans in general and to new comparability in
particular, at its core reflects hostility towards
professionals and small business owners who save
significant amounts for retirement via qualified plans. If, as
an ethical or policy matter, there is something wrong with
such saving, it is plausible to tie such saving to some
putative public good, such as the provision of employer-
guaranteed retirement benefits. Since, however, I do not
share the hostility towards affluent persons who save
significantly toward retirement via qualified plans, I do not
feel the need to constrain their ability to engage in such
savings.
Opponents of small plans often dismiss them as abusive
tax shelters. However, in the current environment, it
confuses, rather than clarifies, to label small employer
plans "tax shelters." That moniker today has meaning, if
not precision, when used to describe highly formalistic
arrangements which lack economic substance beyond tax
upon defined contribution arrangements, equivalent dependence upon defined
benefit devices seems just as problematic. It is accordingly consistent to believe
that, to achieve balance, social security and public pensions should incorporate
elements of an individual account system, but that important segments of the
private pension system have become overly dependent on defined contribution
arrangements and should strive for a more balanced mix of defined benefit and
defined contribution devices.
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savings." The small employer plan, in contrast, has
economic substance since the employer commits real
resources to the plan. The complaint that too little of these
resources goes to rank-and-file employees and too much is
allotted to the professionals and business owners differs
from the argument that a particular device lacks economic
substance. It only confuses to lump together as "tax
shelters" both small plans and arrangements devoid of
economic content.
Finally, there is the matter of intergenerational
symmetry. Abolishing cross-testing for defined contribution
plans says to the older business owner that he can embrace
greater, defined benefit-style allocations only if he provides
guaranteed benefits to his employees. Why then permit the
young business owner to embrace the individual account
arrangement more attractive to him?' If the business
owner's ability to save significantly for himself should be
linked to defined benefits for his workforce, that policy is
equally compelling when the young professional or
entrepreneur is better off with an individual account
arrangement. A rank-and-file employee should not be
deprived of a guaranteed benefit simply because her
employer is a young person better served by an individual
account plan.
The corollary-young highly compensated employees
should get defined contribution coverage only if defined
benefits are extended to the rest of the workforce-is not a
conclusion many would find congenial. Why then tie the
qualified plan design most attractive to an older employer
to her provision of defined benefits to her workforce?
On balance, I conclude that the case for limiting defined
benefit-style allocations of pension resources to defined
benefit plans is substantively weak. That conclusion leaves
us back where we started in terms of substance and form:
There is no reason that an allotment of pension funds,
nondiscriminatory when achieved via a defined benefit
142. There is today much discussion about the existence and extent of tax
shelters used by large corporations. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic
Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221
(2000). The point in the text is that small employer plans should not be
categorized with these shelter arrangements, which lack economic substance
other than tax savings.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 23-27.
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plan, should be deemed discriminatory when accomplished
through a defined contribution arrangement-or vice versa.
III. THE INCOHERENCE OF THE NONDISCRIMINATION NORM
The analysis so far reveals the theoretical and practical
incoherence of the nondiscrimination norm. As a theoretical
matter, the nondiscrimination norm ignores the time value
of money. The pension concept of nondiscrimination equates
nominally identical benefits which, because they will be
paid at different times, have significantly different present
values. Similarly, the nondiscrimination norm equates
significantly different contributions because, over differing
time frames to retirement, these contributions will produce
the same nominal benefits.
Consider, again, our initial example of a fifty year old
business owner and her thirty-five year old secretary."M In
that context, contributions which, as a percentage of
current salary, favor the highly-compensated owner prove
nondiscriminatory when translated into projected benefits.
However, the projected benefits of the owner will commence
in fifteen years at normal retirement while the benefits of
the secretary are fully thirty years away. To compare these
benefits in nominal terms is to ignore the discrepant
present values stemming from the extra fifteen years that
the secretary's benefits will be delayed.
The imbalance in contributions for the business owner
and her secretary accurately reflects an imbalance in the
present values of their respective benefits. Since the owner
gets her plan distribution a decade and one-half sooner
than does her secretary, relatively more must be
contributed to fund the owner's greater entitlement
measured in present value terms. By comparing nominal
benefits and ignoring the different times at which those
benefits will be paid, the nondiscrimination norm ignores
the economic reality of the time value of money.
Given the centrality to the modern Internal Revenue
Code 45 and to much tax policy analysis of time value of
144. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
145. Consider a sample of the provisions added to the Code within the last
two decades to incorporate within the tax law concerns about the time value of
money. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 453A(c), 483 (1994); id. §§ 1271-1274 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997); id. § 1275 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
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money concerns,'46 it is anomalous for the qualified plan
regime to utilize a nondiscrimination norm devoid of such
concerns. Indeed, it is particularly anomalous for the
qualified plan nondiscrimination rules to ignore the time
value of money when the conventional characterization of
the qualified plan regime as a tax expenditure rests upon
the economics of deferring participants' income tax
liabilities until their plan benefits are actually distributed
to them.' The nondiscrimination norm is, in short, a
product of an earlier era, less sensitive than ours to the
time value of money.
In practical terms, when participants are of
significantly different ages, allocations of pension resources
which flunk nondiscrimination testing in defined
contribution terms may pass muster on a defined benefit
basis.' In particular, when highly compensated employees
are substantially older than the rank-and-file members of
the workforce (not an uncommon situation), proportionately
larger contributions for the highly compensated accrue
investment earnings for less time because older, better paid
workers are relatively close to retirement. Consequently,
contributions for these older, highly compensated
employees translate into deferred annuities which are
nondiscriminatory as a percentage of current salary.'
Conversely, if the highly compensated members of an
employer's workforce are younger than their less well paid
co-workers, allocations of pension resources which
discriminate in defined benefit terms prove
nondiscriminatory when analyzed as contributions.
In practice, nondiscrimination proves a meaningful
constraint on qualified plan design in two settings: if a
workforce is relatively homogeneous by age or if the age
distributions of the highly and non-highly compensated
portions of the employer's workforce are comparable. If
workers are of similar ages (for example, a thirty year old
(2000); id. § 7872 (1994 & Supp. IV. 1998), amended by Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114
Stat. 2763 (2000).
146. Indeed, many tax policy analysts have focused exclusively on time
value of money concerns and have thereby ignored other legitimate
considerations. See Zelinsky, supra note 63, at 594.
147. Id.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 40-49.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 40-49.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
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doctor and her thirty year old nurse), all employees have
the same (or reasonably comparable) terms of years to
retirement. Consequently, across the workforce, plan
contributions will accrue investment earnings for the same
number of years and will ripen into similar deferred
annuities as a proportion of current salary. Hence, the
young doctor cannot minimize her pension outlay for her
equally young nurse by switching to either a defined benefit
or a defined contribution methodology for non-
discrimination testing. Under either approach to the
nondiscrimination norm, the doctor will be required to
provide the nurse with contributions and annuity
equivalents which are the same percentage of current
compensation as the doctor contributes for herself, since the
doctor and nurse are of the same age.
Similarly, the nondiscrimination norm meaningfully
constrains qualified plan design when the age distribution
of the employer's highly compensated workforce mimics the
age profile of its rank-and-file workforce (for example, two
physicians, ages thirty and fifty; two nurses, also ages
thirty and fifty). In this kind of setting, defined benefit
formulas favoring the older doctor also advantage the older
nurse. Likewise, insofar as a defined contribution format
increases pension contributions for the younger physician,
that format also favors the younger nurse.
However, when there is significant correlation between
compensation and age-as there often is for professional and
other closely-held employers-the nondiscrimination norm
is substantively empty because relatively small
contributions for younger persons yield relatively large
projected annuities, and comparatively large contributions
for older persons translate into comparatively small
annuity equivalents. In such a context, measuring
contributions for nondiscrimination produces conclusions
totally at variance with the conclusions which emerge from
assessing projected benefits. In this setting, the outcome of
the nondiscrimination inquiry depends upon the form in
which the inquiry is framed: contributions or benefits.
The practical incoherence of the nondiscrimination
norm is most clearly manifested in the context of small
plans, the design of which can readily be manipulated to
benefit an owner or a few owners. Thus, for those who
indict small plans as abusive tax shelters for professionals
and closely-held business persons, the nondiscrimination
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principle fails precisely when it is most needed, i.e., when
the plan can be designed to advantage the affluent
principals of a professional practice or other closely-held
business at the expense of the rank-and-file workforce and
the fisc."1
The problematic nature of the nondiscrimination norm
is not a new phenomenon; the underlying arithmetic is
straightforward. For younger participants, contributions
have more years to compound investment income and thus
translate into relatively larger annuities; for older
participants, the reverse is true. Qualified plan advisors
and commentators have long understood that defined
benefit plans are more attractive for older persons seeking
greater contributions and that individual account formulas
tend to favor younger workers in search of greater plan
contributions."
Why, then, is the incoherence of the nondiscrimination
norm manifesting itself so dramatically now, three
generations after that norm was introduced into the
Internal Revenue Code? Or, to phrase the question
somewhat differently, why are arrangements like cash
balance and new comparability plans (plans which reveal
the incoherence of the nondiscrimination norm) arising
now?
The answer is in part regulatory and in part cultural.
The regulatory burdens which have been placed on defined
benefit plans and the emergence of a defined contribution
culture have triggered the aggressive search for hybrid
formulas, a search which underlines the incoherence of the
nondiscrimination principle.
While ERISA and the legislation following in its wake
encumbered both defined benefit and defined contribution
plans, the burdens placed on defined benefit arrangements
have been greater, leading many employers, particularly
smaller ones, to abandon the defined benefit format or to
avoid that format ab initio. As part of this flight from the
defined benefit motif, some employers and their plan
advisors have searched for hybrid plan designs under which
less heavily-regulated defined contribution arrangements
replicate the substance of defined benefit pensions. That
151. In contrast, large employers, disciplined by labor market forces and
industry standards, typically have less flexibility in structuring their qualified
plans.
152. See McGILL ETAL., supra note 5, at 611-19.
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search, in turn, underscores the incoherence of the
nondiscrimination norm.
Five regulatory factors, in particular, have pushed
employers to eschew defined benefit plans for the individual
account motif.153 (1) I.R.C. § 4980, (2) I.R.C. § 412, (3) PBGC
premiums, (4) compliance costs, and (5) impenetrability.
First, I.R.C. § 4980 effectively denies employers
sponsoring defined benefit plans the ability to recoup
directly 54 superior investment performance in the form of
surplus pension assets. Section 4980 thus skews the risks
and rewards for employers maintaining defined benefit
plans. An employer sponsoring a defined benefit
arrangement retains the full risk of poor investment
performance since, having promised employees specified
benefits, the employer must contribute the amounts
necessary to fund such benefits but, per I.R.C. § 4980, the
employer cannot directly recover superior investment
performance by terminating the plan and reclaiming
surplus assets.
Second, I.R.C. § 412 and the funding standards it
creates constrain the employer's discretion both to reduce
defined benefit funding in times of financial difficulty and
to prefund anticipated benefits when economic conditions
are good. 5 Third, most employers maintaining defined
benefit arrangements must pay premiums to the Pension
153. For a comprehensive discussion of these factors, see Zelinsky, supra
note 6, at 6-2 to 6-11.
154. Surplus pension assets do yield an indirect advantage to the employer
since such assets permit reduction of future contributions to fund benefits
under the plan. See Zelinsky, Cash Balance Controversy, supra note 1, at 714.
Alternatively, surplus assets may permit the employer, without contributing its
own resources to the plan, to increase benefits of strategic importance to the
employer. Most commonly, surplus defined benefit funds may permit the
employer, at no direct cost to it, to create early retirement windows to
encourage older workers to quit. See, e.g., Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189
F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999). However, the asymmetry remains: the employer is
directly liable for any funding shortfall, but cannot directly recoup any surplus
assets for itself.
155. For purposes of the present discussion, the relevant rules impose
minimum funding obligations on employers, I.R.C. § 412(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp.
III 1997), impose maximum funding limitations, id. §§ 412(a)(7), 404(a)(1)(A)
(1994), penalize employers' failure to meet their minimum funding obligations,
id. § 4971 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), and penalize employers for overfunding. Id. §
4972.
620 [Vol. 49
IS CROSS-TESTING A MISTAKE?
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), 6' the government-
run insurance corporation which underwrites basic
pensions promised by insolvent defined benefit plans.'57
Fourth, the actuarial, legal and accounting costs associated
with defined benefit plans are generally greater than the
compliance costs associated with individual account
arrangements.
Finally, the legal rules for defined benefit plans have
made such plans harder for employers and employees to
understand than defined contribution arrangements. The
resulting impenetrability deters employers from embracing
defined benefit plans and the comparatively opaque set of
obligations associated with them.'58
Not all of these factors have had the same impact on all
employers and all plans. Small businesses and professional
employers are typically more sensitive to the legal,
accounting and actuarial fees associated with defined
benefit arrangements than are publicly-traded corporations.
Small professional employers are not covered by the PBGC
insurance scheme and thus do not owe PBGC premiums if
they maintain defined benefit plans.'59 New comparability
and age-weighted formulas, though they are defined
contribution plans, no doubt entail administrative and
compliance costs which rival those of defined benefit
plans-and are probably as hard for employers to
understand.
Nevertheless, on balance, the regulation imposed by
ERISA and by the legislation coming after ERISA has
burdened defined benefit plans more heavily than
individual account arrangements.6 ' While some employers
have absorbed the regulatory costs placed upon defined
benefit plans, others have switched to defined contribution
arrangements, for example, the now-ubiquitous 401(k) plan.
156. Small professional employers are exempt from both PBGC coverage
and premiums. See ERISA § 4021(b)(13), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(13) (1994).
157. Congress has geared these premiums to the plan's solvency and, hence,
its risk of default. See id. § 4006(b)(13), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(b)(13). The result is
higher premiums for some plans and lower PBGC premiums for others.
158. Anyone who doubts the opacity of the legal rules pertaining to defined
benefit plans need only peruse the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA
provisions identified in the three preceding footnotes.
159. See id. § 4021(b)(13), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(13).
160. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 45, at 9 ("The rules for defined




Of employers embracing defined contribution arrange-
ments, many (particularly smaller employers) have sought
to retain the distributional patterns which, before ERISA,
such employers would have achieved via defined benefit
arrangements. Hence, the search for hybrid plans, which,
as defined contribution arrangements, avoid the regulatory
burdens of defined benefit plans but, via cross-testing,
emulate the distributions of pension resources achieved by
defined benefit arrangements.
In this context, new comparability is the actuarial
equivalent of the search for the perfect wave, an effort to
fine-tune defined contribution plans via cross-testing to
concentrate pension resources on older employees, typically
the principals of the sponsoring employer. Prior to ERISA,
this search was unnecessary; the defined benefit motif was
used to achieve such results. The recent and dramatic
growth of new comparability exposes the hollowness of the
nondiscrimination norm because pension contributions,
discriminatory when viewed as such, become non-
discriminatory when converted to annuity equivalents.
The increased regulation of defined benefit plans has
reinforced the emergence of a defined contribution culture.
A generation ago, most people, when they thought about
pensions, thought in defined benefit terms, envisioning
retirement income as a specified amount guaranteed by the
employer as an annuity. Today, pensions are popularly
conceived in defined contribution terms. For many
Americans, the paradigmatic pension is now the 401(k) or
the individual retirement account.
Like most cultural shifts, the emergence of a defined
contribution culture has many causes. As the greater
regulatory burdens imposed upon defined benefit
arrangements moved employers to individual account
plans, more employees experienced retirement savings in
the defined contribution form and came to accept that form
as normative. The bull market of the 1990s fortified the
defined contribution culture, as burgeoning 401(k) and
individual retirement accounts made the employer's
promise to provide a specified benefit seem unnecessary-
indeed stodgy. The decline of labor unions, bastions of the
defined benefit pension, bolstered the transition to a
defined contribution culture as comparatively less of the
workforce heard the unions' argument for defined benefit
arrangements. Instead, more of the workforce was exposed
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to the heavy advertising of the financial services industry,
advertising which emphasizes the benefits of holding and
investing retirement savings through 401(k) arrangements,
IRAs, and other defined contribution devices.
The upshot has been a sea change in the way
Americans experience and think about pensions. For the
purposes of the present discussion, the most important
manifestation of a defined contribution culture has been the
remarkable growth of cash balance plans, defined benefit
arrangements designed to resemble defined contribution
schemes. 6' Such plans were literally inconceivable to earlier
generations, for whom a pension was a defined benefit
annuity. Cash balance plans can mimic defined contribution
arrangements because employees have come to think of
pensions in defined contribution terms.
IV. AGE DISCRIMINATION
While the principal focus of this article is
nondiscrimination as to rank-and-file employees, the
controversy sparked by the growth of cash balance plans-
in particular, debate about whether such plans discriminate
on the basis of age-underscores the incoherence of the
nondiscrimination norm. Again, the arithmetic is
straightforward: as participants age, the same dollar
contribution purchases less annuity income at retirement
since there is less time for that dollar to accrue investment
earnings. Hence, if two employees earning the same salary
receive the same contribution to their respective notional
cash balance accounts, the annuity value of that
contribution is less for the older of them.1
6
2
Does this constitute age discrimination? As a matter of
law, I conclude that it does since cash balance
arrangements are defined benefit plans and (unlike the
statute proscribing discrimination in favor of highly
161. But this is by no means the only manifestation of the defined
contribution culture. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 6-14 to 6-29. When I wrote
this article, the movement towards public employee defined contribution plans
was nascent. It has since developed with remarkable speed. See, e.g., Michael
Bologna, State Retirement Systems, Legislatures Developing Wide Range of
Innovative Plans, 27 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1752, 1753 (July 25, 2000) ("The
most innovative of such changes included the creation of optional defined
contribution retirement plans in four states.").
162. See Zelinsky, Cash Balance Controversy, supra note 1, at 722, 734;
Zelinsky, Cash Balance Controversy Revisited, supra note 1, at 561-62.
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compensated employees) the statute outlawing age
discrimination in pensions lacks sufficient flexibility to
authorize cross-testing in that context. 163 As a matter of
policy, I conclude that this result, while mandated by the
statute, is wrong.
For present purposes, the issue is not whether I am
correct or whether those taking a different tack have the
better argument. Rather, the issue is the fashion in which
this controversy illuminates the incoherence of the
nondiscrimination norm. There is no doubt that, if cash
balance plans can test for discrimination on the basis of
contributions, they pass muster since such plans typically
credit theoretical contributions as a percentage of salary,
regardless of age."6' In contrast, if cash balance
contributions are converted into the projected annuities
they purchase, a quite different picture emerges, one in
which, as active employees age, the annuity values of their
respective contributions decline.'
In short, debate about cash balance plans and age
discrimination has been unproductive because, inter alia,
the fundamental concept-nondiscrimination-is in this
context incoherent, producing fundamentally different
results if the issue is framed in terms of contributions than
if the issue is posed in terms of ultimate benefits.
A second corollary flows from the Code's failure to
authorize cross-testing in the context of age discrimination:
163. Compare I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994) ("contributions or benefits provided
under the plan [can] not discriminate in favor of highly compensated
employees") with id. § 411(b)(1)(G) ("a defined benefit plan shall be treated as
not satisfying the requirements of this paragraph if the participant's accrued
benefit is reduced on account of any increase in his age or service") and id. §
411(b)(2)(A) ("A defined contribution plan satisfies the requirements of this
paragraph if, under the plan, allocations to the employee's account are not
ceased, and the rate at which amounts are allocated to the employee's account
is not reduced, because of the attainment of any age.").
164. Indeed, some cash balance plans actually increase theoretical
contributions with age.
165. Those who assert that cash balance plans are not age discriminatory
under current law often cite the arithmetic of post-retirement benefit accruals.
See Zelinsky, Cash Balance Controversy Revisited, supra note 1, at 570-73. In
some (perhaps many) cases, annual contributions after normal retirement may
produce increasingly larger annuities because of increasing mortality. However,
even in these examples, the math before normal retirement indicates that, as
active employees get older, the same dollar contribution has less time to
compound interest and therefore produces less annuity income as of normal
retirement.
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plans which do not discriminate against rank-and-file
employees when cross-tested may, under current law,
nevertheless discriminate as to age because, as to age, there
is no statutory basis for cross-testing. For example, consider
again a defined benefit plan which provides smaller
annuities for older, non-highly-compensated participants.
Via cross-testing, this plan may be deemed
nondiscriminatory on a contribution basis since
contributions are proportionate to each employee's
compensation.6 '
As a matter of policy, there is no reason why this
pattern of contributions should not also be deemed age
neutral since each participant, regardless of age, receives
the same contribution as a percentage of his salary.
Nevertheless, under the current statutes, the relevant test
for age discrimination under a defined benefit plan is the
pattern of projected annuities. There is no authority in this
context for cross-testing, i.e., assessing the presence of age
discrimination vel non on the basis of a defined benefit
plan's pattern of contributions. Since the plan's anticipated
benefits decline as employees get older, this plan age
discriminates under present law.
By contrast, the typical new comparability defined
contribution plan,"7 which passes muster under § 401(a)(4)
by cross-testing for anticipated benefits, is not age
discriminatory under current law since contributions
increase (rather than decrease) for older participants. And,
under present law, it is the pattern of contributions, not of
projected benefits, which determines whether or not an
individual account arrangement is age discriminatory.
V. IMPLICATIONS
From all of the foregoing, I conclude that the concept of
nondiscrimination should be purged from the pension law
since the outcome of the nondiscrimination inquiry turns on
the form in which pension resources are measured, i.e., as
contributions or as projected annuities. Whatever the
merits of formalism in other contexts,.68 in the pension
166. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33. This is the cash balance
paradigm.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
168. There are many contexts in which legal systems properly emphasize
form, principally when it is important to reduce transaction costs. In the tax
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setting, there is no sound reason for treating allotments of
pension resources as nondiscriminatory when measured as
contributions, but as discriminatory when assessed as
projected annuity benefits. The form by which particular
allocations of pension resources are accomplished should
not entail disparate legal results.
The simplest response to this reality is to abolish the
nondiscrimination rule. Others, confronted with the
practical and theoretical incoherence of the
nondiscrimination norm, might instead be tempted to
reformulate that norm to reflect time value of money
concerns. One could, for example, envision a new version of
the nondiscrimination rule under which all benefits are
reduced to present value prior to comparison for
discrimination. Starting with a deep skepticism of much of
the present framework governing qualified plans, that
approach strikes me as unwise, compounding the
complexity of a regulatory scheme that is already too
complicated and intrusive.
I suspect that, even for many favoring a more
paternalistic pension policy than I support, the
nondiscrimination norm has outlived its usefulness. For
those troubled by the outright abolition of the
nondiscrimination norm but skeptical of introducing more
complexity to the qualified plan regime, a viable alternative
to the status quo is to replace the nondiscrimination norm
with straightforward minima, for example, any defined
contribution plan must provide each participant with a
contribution of at least 3% annually; any defined benefit
arrangement must provide each participant yearly with a
minimum annuity of 3% of that year's income.
law, for example, it is often said that taxpayers are stuck with the form in
which they cast their transactions, primarily to facilitate review and
enforcement by the taxing authorities. See, e.g., Nestle Holdings, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 152 F.3d 83, 87 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998) (asserting "the general rule that a
taxpayer is bound by the chosen form of its transaction"). But see Kenneth L.
Harris, Should There Be a 'Form Consistency' Requirement? Danielson Revisited
78 TAxEs 88 (2000). Emphasis on form can also be understood as enhancing
predictability and fairness in a legal system: When everyone knows that certain
forms produce specific outcomes, the legal system is predictable and treats
everyone embracing those forms similarly. For purposes of the present
discussion, none of these considerations bolster the highly formalistic nature of
pension law's nondiscrimination norm.
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The Code already contains rules of this sort for plans
deemed "top-heavy"'69  and for safe harbor 401(k)
arrangements.17 It would be both simpler and more
coherent to generalize these rules to the universe of
qualified plans and then purge the concept of
nondiscrimination from the pension law.
In light of all of this, is cross-testing a mistake? I
conclude not. As long as we retain the nondiscrimination
norm, cross-testing is a textually plausible reading of the
statute which imparts useful flexibility to the body of law
which overregulates qualified plans. Underlying this
conclusion is the premise that the form through which
pension allocations are achieved should not matter and
that, consequently, devices like cash balance plans, age-
weighted arrangements, and new comparability plans (in
both their superintegrated and categorization forms) are
legitimate insofar as they mimic the outcomes obtainable
under more conventional defined benefit and defined
contribution plans. As long as such conventional plans
provide a statutorily-approved baseline, there is no
principled basis for opposing hybrid plans, which, via cross-
testing, achieve substantively similar outcomes.
Cross-testing does highlight the hollowness of the
nondiscrimination norm, by condoning on the basis of
projected benefits allocations of pension resources which
flunk on a contribution basis, and vice versa. However, the
appropriate response is not to kill the messenger, but to
reassess the message. Before ERISA, the incoherence of the
nondiscrimination norm did not matter in practice because
employers were relatively free to pick between defined
contribution and defined benefit arrangements. Only with
ERISA and the subsequent decline of the defined benefit
plan has it become necessary for employers to push the
envelope in terms of plan design. That the resulting, cross-
tested hybrid devices reveal the hollowness of the
nondiscrimination norm suggests, not that there is
something wrong with cross-testing, but that there is
something wrong with that norm.
169. See I.R.C. § 416 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).




When probed, the controversies currently absorbing the
qualified plan community-Are cash balance plans
legitimate? Should new comparability be permitted?-
reveal an underlying issue: the propriety of the cross-
testing which facilities these hybrid pension arrangements.
Cross-testing, in turn, reveals the incoherence of the
nondiscrimination norm, as allocations of pension resources
deemed discriminatory when characterized in defined
benefit terms become acceptable when framed in defined
contribution terms, and vice versa.
The allocations of pension resources achieved by the
controversial hybrid devices, via cross-testing, mimic the
allocations achievable by more conventional defined
contribution and defined benefit plans. There is no reason
for the form by which retirement resources are allocated to
be of controlling legal significance.
Cross-testing imparts useful flexibility to the body of
law which overregulates qualified plans. Insofar as cross-
testing highlights the theoretical and practical incoherence
of the nondiscrimination norm, it is that norm, not cross-
testing, which has outlived its usefulness.
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